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ADMIRALTY /MARITIME LAW 
VESSEL OWNER'S RIGHT TO RELY ON 
THE STEVEDORE TO PROTECT 
LONGSHOREMEN FROM PRE-EXISTING 
OBVIOUS· DANGERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
TAYLOR and OLLEST AD DECISIONS 
Wayne F. Emard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Now over a dozen years ago, amendments to the 
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act (LHWCA) beached the skow UNSEAWOR-
THINESS built by Sieracki, to launch a new vessel 
for longshoreman recovery-the clipper REASONA-
BLE CARE. Able crafters though they were, the 
Shipbuilders of Capitol Hill were unwilling to 
venture out on the waters of tort law and left the 
REASONABLE CARE adrift in the doldrums of 
vagueness, its destiny in the steady hands of its 
nine Supreme Pilots and its energetic (but rarely 
cohesive) Circuit and District crew. 'Through the 
Straits of De Los Santos,' was the Pilot's terse 
command. l 
The crew of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recently 
• B.A. magna cum laude, Providence College 1976; J.D. cum laude University of 
San Francisco School of Law 1982. Mr. Emard is an associate in the firm of Acret and 
Perrochet, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California. 
1. Stass v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., 720 F.2d 879, 880 (5th Cir. 1983). It is 
initially noted that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act was 
amended in 1984, including Section 905(b). However, these amendments do not have a 
significant bearing on this article. 
1 
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chartered the clipper REASONABLE CARE on two separate voyages 
through the Straits of De Los Santos. 2 With Judge Anderson at 
the helm in Taylor v. Moram Agencies,3 the court braved the 
choppy seas created by tropical storms Subingsubing,· Davis/' 
2. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156 (1981) (hereinafter 
cited as Scindia). In Scindia, three principles were enunciated. First, the vessel owner 
must exercise ordinary care under the circumstances in turning over a vessel and equip-
ment in such a condition that an expert stevedore can carryon its operation with reason-
able safety. In discharging its duty, the owner is entitled to rely on the stevedore's per-
formance of its task with reasonable care. Vessel owner must also warn the stevedore of 
any hidden unsafe conditions on the ship of which the owner is, or should be, aware. 
Second, once the stevedore begins its operations, the vessel owner has no duty to super-
vise its work or to inspect the area assigned to the stevedore, unless contract provision, 
positive law, or custom impose such a duty. In short, the vessel owner has no general 
duty to monitor the stevedore's operations, but is entitled to rely on the stevedore's ex-
pertise and reasonableness. This reliance, however, is not justified if some explicit duty is 
recognized by the parties or imposed by law. Third, the vessel owner has a duty to pro-
tect the stevedore's employees during the stevedore's operations only if the owner be-
comes aware that the ship or its gear poses a danger to the stevedore's employees and 
the owner learns that the stevedore is acting unreasonably in failing to protect its em-
ployees. The vessel owner is charged with knowledge of the defect if the danger develops 
during the stevedore's operations and the owner has actual knowledge of it, or if the 
danger exists at the outset, in which case the owner must be deemed to have knowledge. 
Id. at 166-77. 
3. Taylor v. Moram Agencies, 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Anderson, J.; the 
other panel members were Skopil, 0., and Ferguson, W., dissenting). 
4. Subingsubing v. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd., 682 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1982) (per 
Fletcher, B.B.; the other panel members were Pregerson, J., and Reinhardt, S.). In Sub-
ingsubing, a longshoreman was injured when he stepped on a small piece of wood, called 
a "dead-eye," used to stop the steps of a rope ladder from moving. The issue was 
whether the shipowner owed a duty of reasonable care to remove from the ship's deck, 
before the longshoremen came aboard, a dangerous, non-obvious, tripping hazard. The 
trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that there was no duty 
to inspect, discover, remedy, or warn of wood on the deck within the confines of the 
stevedoring operation. The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that the issue in the instant 
case was not whether the shipowner had a continuing duty to inspect and supervise the 
operations of the stevedore, but whether the owner, in the exercise of the duty of reason-
able care, should have removed the tripping hazard before the longshore worker came on 
deck. The court noted that the vessel owed the longshore worker a duty that extended to 
at least exercising ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equip-
ment in such a condition that an expert and experienced stevedore would be able, by the 
exercise of reasonable care, to carryon its cargo operations with reasonable safety to 
persons and property. Id. at 781-82. 
5. Davis v. Partenreederei M.S. NORMANNIA, 657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1981) (per 
Grant, R.A., sitting by designation; other panel members were Fletcher, B.B., and Fergu-
son, W.). In Davis, the longshoreman was struck by cargo being unloaded from the vessel 
allegedly as a result of the dangerous proximity of the gangway to the unloading process. 
The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict for plaintiff. The jury attributed 
twenty percent comparative fault to the vessel, forty percent to the plaintiff and forty 
percent to the stevedore. The judgment, however, was reduced only by the plaintiff's 
negligence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that since the gangway was under the 
concurrent control of the vessel and stevedore, the vessel had a continuing duty to repo-
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and Turner6 and, despite dissention by fellow crewmember Fer-
guson,7 sailed smoothly through the confines of the straits. 
A second crew manned the REASONABLE CARE in Ollestad v. 
Greenville Steamship Corp.,s in a subsequent attempt to negoti-
ate the perilous Straits of De Los Santos with Circuit Judge 
Fletcher as the helmsperson. Succumbing to the winds created 
by Subingsubing,9 Turner,lo and Davis/ 1 the crew opted to 
avoid the Straits and seek refuge in the Bay of Bueno. 12 While 
the courage of that crew is admirable, they failed to comply with 
sition it if safety required. Requiring the vessel to pay that portion of the judgment 
attributable to the stevedore is in keeping with the LHWCA, which shields the stevedore 
from contribution or indemnity. [d. at 1052·53. 
6. Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Fletcher, B.B.; the 
other panel members were Ferguson, W., and Grant, R.A., sitting by designation). In 
Turner, the vessel PRESIDENT QUEZON was owned by Philippine President Lines and was 
time-chartered to Japan Lines, Ltd. The cargo of plywood was loaded by a Japanese 
stevedore pursuant to a contract with the time-charterer. There was expert testimony 
that the plywood was negligently and improperly stacked, as it was not shored properly. 
The plaintiff longshoreman was seriously injured when a stack of lumber collapsed and 
he was hit on the head. A jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff was overturned by the 
district court when judgment N.O.V. was granted defendant. [d. at 1301-02. On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that §905(b) does not bar the 
shipowner from recovering against the foreign stevedore, only from recovering against 
the employer, as defined in the Act. The vessel can ensure safety by chosing reliable 
foreign stevedore, supervising its work when necessary, and warning the off-loading ste-
vedore of concealed, dangerous conditions created by the foreign stevedore. The court 
concluded that the vessel had a duty to protect plaintiff from concealed dangers created 
by the foreign stevedore which the vessel could, in the exercise of reasonable care, have 
corrected or warned of. [d. at 1302-04. 
7. 739 F.2d 1384, 1389 (1984) (Ferguson, W., dissenting). 
8. Ollestad v. Greenville Steamship Corp., 738 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1984) (per 
Fletcher, B.; the other panel members were Wright, E., and Anderson, J.). 
9. 657 F.2d 1048. 
10. 651 F.2d 1300. See also text accompanying note 6, supra. 
11. 657 F.2d 1048. See also text accompanying note 5, supra. 
l2. Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d 318 (9th Cir, 1982) (per Fletcher, B.B.; the 
other panel members were Pregerson, J., and Reinhardt, S.). In Bueno, the plaintiff long-
shore worker, while re-entering the hold of a vessel, fell through a space left open after 
the removal of scaffolding by a third-party sandblaster. Plaintiff filed a negligence suit in 
admiralty against his employer, the United States, and the company which jointly con-
tracted with plaintiff's employer to provide sandblasting services. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants and plaintiff appealed. [d. at 318-
19. The Ninth Circuit held that a factual issue existed as to whether the United States, 
as vessel owner, was negligent in its failure to remedy a dangerous situation created by 
the employer. The court noted that under Scindia, the United States, as vessel owner, 
owed a duty of care to plaintiff, having assumed an affirmative duty to conduct periodic 
safety inspections during the repairs. Because there were genuine issues of material fact 
as to whether the United States breached that duty, summary judgment in favor of the 
United States was inappropriate. [d. at 320-21. 
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the Supreme Pilot's commands and truly test the seaworthiness 
of the clipper REASONABLE CARE. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 1927, Congress enacted the Longshoremen and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act,13 hereinafter referred to as 
LHWCA. As originally framed, the Act established workers com-
pensation as the longshoreman's exclusive remedy against a ste-
vedore;a however, the Act made no specific provision for a 
third-party tort action brought by a longshoreman against the 
vessel owner. During the period prior to 1972, the Supreme 
Court was left to fashion the form of recovery available to an 
injured longshoreman against a vessel and its owner. In Seas 
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki/a the Court extended a cause of action 
based upon unseaworthiness l8 to the longshoreman against the 
vessel owner. Unseaworthiness is a form of strict liability which 
had previously been reserved only to actions by seamen. 
Ten years after Sieracki, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan 
Atlantic Steamship Corp.,I? the Court held that a vessel owner 
13. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-803, §§1-51, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended 33 
U.S.C. §§905-51 (1984). 
14. 33 U.S.C. §905 (1970), as amended; 33 U.S.C. §905 (1984). 
15. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, Inc., 328 U.S. 85 (1946). In Sieracki, the court 
extended to longshoremen the right given to seamen to recover against the shipowner, 
without the need of establishing negligence, for injuries caused by the unseaworthiness of 
the vessel. Sieracki was the employee of a stevedore and was injured when a shackle 
supporting a boom broke. Plaintiff sued the shipowner and two other parties whose neg-
ligence he alleged caused his injury. The district court, Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 57 
F.Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1944), found that the condition of the shackle rendered the vessel 
unseaworthy; that there was no negligence on the part of the shipowner; that the two 
third-party defendants were negligent; and that recovery should be had only against 
those third parties. The court of appeals, Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98 (3rd 
Cir. 1945), accepted the findings on unseaworthiness and negligence made by the district 
court, but concluded that Sieracki could recover against the shipowner on the ground of 
unseaworthiness, irrespective of the latter's lack of fault. Five justices of the Supreme 
Court approved the position taken by the court of appeals and affirmed Sieracki's 
recovery. 
16. The warranty of seaworthiness was extended to seamen because of the special 
hazards of their work, the rigorous discipline to which they were subjected, and the'spe-
cial protection traditionally accorded them by admiralty courts. Mahnich v. Southern 
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). Since longshoremen were not considered "seamen," they did 
not have the benefit of the warranty of seaworthiness. However, they could bring an 
action against the shipowner for negligence, a remedy that was not available to seamen. 
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). 
17. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). 
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could seek indemnity from the stevedore employer based upon a 
breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike performance!' 
Thus evolved the so-called Sieracki-Ryan I9 doctrine, effectively 
negating the stevedore's exclusive liability under former §905 of 
the LHWCA. The doctrine provided a circuitous action whereby 
the injured longshoreman recovered from the vessel owner, who 
could then obtain indemnity fr'om the longshoreman's employer, 
the stevedore, who was statutorily liable for payment of 
compensation.20 
In 1972, Congress responded to the Sieracki-Ryan dilemma 
and made a number of significant changes in the LHWCA 
through enactment of long-awaited amendments.21 Among other 
things, the LHWCA Amendments broadened the scope of cover-
age while increasing compensation benefits.22 A third-party ac-
18. In Ryan, the court was faced with the question of whether a shipowner, who was 
forced to pay damages to a longshoreman injured by the unsafe storage of cargo, could 
recover indemnity from the stevedoring company for whom the longshoreman worked. 
Even in the absence of any indemnity provision, the court held that the stevedoring 
company was liable to the shipowner because it had promised to store the cargo safely. 
The court was not convinced by arguments that its result made the economic burden of 
the longshoreman's recovery fall on the stevedoring employer contrary to the purpose of 
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. Section 5 of the Act, before its present 
amendment, provided that the liability of an employer would be exclusive and in place of 
all other liability of such employer to the employee and its legal representatives and 
anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer at law or in admiralty 
on account of injury or death. The exception was where an employer had failed to secure 
the payment of compensation, in which event the person concerned could elect to claim 
compensation either under the Act or by way of a separate suit. Id. at 128-29. 
19. The Sieracki-Ryan doctrine deprived the stevedore of its immunity from civil 
suit for damages stemming from the personal injury of its employees. Since the Sieracki 
doctrine of unseaworthiness was very broad, few injuries were outside its scope, and the 
federal courts were flooded with longshoremen's injury actions. See Deacon, The Injured 
Longshoreman v. The Shipowner, 28 HASTINGS L.J., 771, 776 (1977). 
20.Id. 
21. Among Congress' primary goals in amending the Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act in 1972 were the improvement of the Act's benefit structure 
and the general safety of prevailing working conditions. See H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7, (1972) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report], which states: 
Id. 
Permitting actions against the vessel based on negligence will 
meet the objective of encouraging safety because the vessel 
will still be required to exercise the same care as a land-based 
person in providing a safe place to work. Thus, nothing in this 
Bill is intended to derogate from the vessel's responsibility to 
take appropriate corrective action where it knows or should 
have known about a dangerous condition. 
22. See Committee Report, Id. at 2-3. 
5
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tion against a negligent "vessel" was created by the addition of 
subsection (b) to § 905, and the unseaworthiness remedy, with 
respect to longshoremen, was nullified.23 
As originally intended, the trade-off was a fair one. The in-
jured longshoreman received tax free benefits which often 
equaled or exceeded pre-injury take-home pay.24 The benefits 
were based on double the national average weekly wage with an-
nual unlimited tax-free escalation.2tl The vessel interests were 
denied their indemnity action against the stevedore in exchange 
for the elimination of a longshoreman's recovery based upon the 
doctrine of unseaworthiness.26 The stevedore regained its insula-
tion from what was, in effect, the longshoreman's tort recovery 
against it.27 
23. 33 U.S.C. §905(b) (1984). The first sentence of §905(b) permits longshoremen 
and harbor workers to sue the vessel for negligence. The section states: 
[d. 
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter 
caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or any-
one otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, 
may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in 
accordance with the provisions of §933 of this Title, and the 
employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages 
directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the 
contrary shall be void. 
33 U.S.C. §902(21) (1984), defines the term "vessel," as follows: 
The term vessel means any vessel upon which or in connection 
with which any person entitled to benefits under this Chapter 
suffers injury or death arising out of or in the course of his 
employment, and said vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, 
agent, operator, charterer, or bareboat charterer, master, of-
ficer, or crew member. 
The last clause of §905(b) not only abolishes the Ryan implied warranty of work-
manlike performance, but also provides that an employer cannot be held liable "directly 
or indirectly" for its employee's injuries. Contractual clauses purporting to shift this lia-
bility to the employer will be null and void. In the second and third sentences of §905(b), 
Congress appears to have overruled Reed v. The YAKA, 373 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1963). See 
GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 444-45 (2d ed. 1975). [Hereinafter cited as 
GILMORE & BLACK.) The fourth sentence of §905(b) overrules Sieracki, and the last sen-
tence prevents the development of a new strict liability theory by making negligence the 
exclusive basis for recovery against the shipowner. 
For a general review of the amendments, see Gorman, The Longshoremen's and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act-Alter the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MARITIME L. & 
COMM., 1 (1974). 
24. The compensation scheme, at a minimum, was double the compensation pay-
ments to most covered employees. See Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 3. 
25. 33 U.S.C. §906(b) (1984). 
26. See Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 4-8. 
27. 33 U.S.C. §905(a) (1984). 
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Since §905(b) of the LHWCA does not define the standard 
of care which Congress intended vessels to exercise toward long-
shoremen,28 numerous courts have taken various approaches in 
defining the vessel owner's standard of care and in interpreting 
the legislative history of the 1972 amendments with respect to 
open and obvious dangers on board the vessel.29 The Court of 
Appeals for the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits relied upon 
§§343 and 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts30 in defin-
28. Section 905(b) merely provides the broad outlines of the third-party action, and 
it must be read in conjunction with the legislative history in order to discern congres-
sional intent as to the applicable standard of care. The House Report sought a compro-
mise position and rejected both proposals by the shipping industry that a third-party 
action by totally abolished and the longshoremen's proposal that the strict liability rem-
edy be continued. See Committee Report, supra, note 21 at 4-5. The congressional re-
ports reject the assumption that longshoremen encounter seamen's hazards and therefore 
should have seamen's remedies. [d. at 5-6. For example, in International Stevedoring Co. 
v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926), the Supreme Court extended the Jones Act remedy, 48 
U.S.C. §688 (1970), to longshoremen by holding that for purposes of the Jones Act, long-
shoremen were seamen. In response to the Haverty decision, Congress enacted the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act within 6 months. See Act of Mar. 4, 
1927, Pub. L. No. 69-803, §§1-51, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§901-51 (1984). 
29. Congress, in failing to provide an adequate definition of negligence, left the 
courts the task of fashioning a uniform standard for determining the scope of the ship-
owner's duty of care towards longshoremen. As a result, a clear philosophical split arose 
among the circuits. For example, in Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682 (2nd Cir, 
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1980), the Second Circuit stated that it would continue 
to adhere to the view that §343(a) of the Restatement (SECOND) of Torts was the appro-
priate standard for determining negligence under §905(b). That standard is that a vessel 
is not liable for injuries resulting from known or obvious dangers unless shipowner 
should anticipate the harm, despite the obviousness of the danger. See also Evans v. 
Transportation Maritima Mexicana, S.S., 639 F.2d 848, 855 (2nd Cir, 1981). The Fourth 
and Fifth Circuits, relying primarily on the legislative history of the Act, also consist-
ently applied land-based principles of negligence as embodied in the Restatement (SEC-
OND) of Torts, §§343, 343A. See Anuszewski v. Dynamic Mariners Corp., 540 F.2d 757, 
759 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Dunlap v. G. & C. Towing, Inc., 613 F.2d 493 (4th Cir. 
1980), Chavis v. Finnlines, Ltd., 576 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1978), Gay v. Ocean Transport & 
Trading, Ltd., 546 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977), and Hess v. Upper Mississippi Towing Cor-
poration, 559 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1977). However, the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits 
took the position that the shipowner's conduct could only be judged through the applica-
tion of maritime principles of negligence. See Johnson v. AlS Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 
334, 347 (1st Cir. 1980), Griffith v. Wheeling Pittsburg Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116 (3rd Cir. 
1979), Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd., 605 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1979), Lawson v. 
United States, 605 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1979). 
30. The Restatement sections state: 
§343. Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by 
Possessor 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, 
he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would dis-
cover the condition, and should realize that it involves an un-
7
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ing the standard of care.31 The First, Third, and Ninth Circuits, 
however, held that these sections should not apply in §905(b) 
suits, since they might bar a longshoreman from recovery if he 
was contributorily negligent, or if he voluntarily encountered a 
known or obvious risk, defenses which are not cognizable in 
admiralty. 32 
Finally, in 1981, the Supreme Court of the United States 
grappled with this issue in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v .. De 
Los Santos. 33 In Scindia, a longshoreman was injured when 
sacks of wheat fell from a pallet being lowered into a cargo hold 
by a longshoreman operating a ship's winch. The braking mech-
anism of the winch had been malfunctioning for two days prior 
to the longshoreman's injury. The United States District Court 
for the Western District of Washington34 granted summary judg-
ment for the vessel, holding that, under the negligence standards 
governing actions under §905(b), a shipowner is not liable for 
dangerous conditions created by the stevedore's negligence while 
the stevedore is in exclusive control of the manner and the area 
of work, and the shipowner has no duty to warn the stevedore or 
its employees of open and obvious defects. 311 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
reversed,38 holding that a shipowner may be subject to liability 
31. [d. 
32. [d. 
reasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them 
against the danger. 
§343 A. Known or Obvious Dangers 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical 
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land 
whose danger is known or obvious to them unless the posses-
sor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or ob-
viousness. (2) In determining whether the possessor should an-
ticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that 
the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the 
facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance indicating 
that the harm should be anticipated. 
33. 451 U.S. 156 (1981). 
34. De Los Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 1976 AMC 2583 (W.O. Wash. 
1976). 
35. [d. at 2585. 
36. Santos v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1979) (per 
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if it knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care should dis-
cover, a defective condition on the vessel which involves an un-
reasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen and fails to exercise 
reasonable care to protect the longshoremen against the 
danger,3? 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court 
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's view of vessel liability and 
established a framework within which to determine the standard 
of care owed by the vessel owner to longshoremen, particularly 
with regard to open and obvious dangers arising during the 
cargo operation,38 The court adopted the standard established in 
Marine Terminals v. Burnside Shipping Co.3S with respect to 
obvious dangers existing prior to turning the vessel over to the 
stevedore,40 It stated that the Restatement rule,n while relevant, 
Duniway, B.C.; the other panel members were Choy, H., and Grant, R.A., sitting by 
designation). 
37. ld. at 485. 
38. The Court summarized the vessel's duty once the independent contractor has 
begun operations: 
We are of the view that absent contract provision, positive 
law, or custom to the contrary-none of which has been cited 
to us in this case-the shipowner has no general duty by way 
of supervision or inspection to exercise reasonable care to dis-
cover dangerous conditions that develop within the confines of 
the cargo operations that are assigned to the stevedore. The 
necessary consequence is that the shipowner is not liable to 
the longshoreman for injuries caused by dangers unknown to 
the. owner and about which he had no duty to inform himself. 
This conclusion is plainly consistent with the congressional in-
tent to foreclose the faultless liability of the shipowner based 
on a theory of unseaworthiness or non-delegable duty. The 
shipowner, within limits, is entitled to rely on the stevedore, 
and owes no duty to the longshoremen to inspect or supervise 
cargo operations. 
451 U.S. at 172. 
The court further noted that: 
ld. at 170. 
As a general matter, the shipowner may rely on the stevedore 
to avoid exposing the longshoremen to unreasonable hazards. 
Section 41 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §941, requires the stevedore, 
the longshoreman's employer, to provide a 'reasonably safe 
place to work' and to take such safeguards with respect to 
equipment and working conditions as the Secretary of Labor 
may determine to be necessary to avoid injury to longshore-
men. The ship is not the common employer of the longshore-
men and owes no such statutory duty to them. 
39. 394 U.S. 404 (1969). 
40. The court stated: 
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was not controlling in establishing the shipowner's duty to long-
shoremen, at least under the facts of that case.42 The court also 
recognized, and both parties agreed, that a vessel owner may 
subject itself to additional liability if it actively "involves" itself 
in the cargo operations and negligently injures a longshoreman, 
or if it fails to exercise due care in protecting longshoremen from 
hazards they may encounter in areas under the "active" control 
of the vessel owner. 43 
The Supreme Court held that there was a triable issue of 
fact in Scindia on whether the shipowner had actual knowledge 
of the failure of the winch's braking mechanism or could be 
charged with knowledge because the winch was defective from 
the outset. If Scindia was aware that the winch was malfunction-
ing to some degree, and if there was a jury question as to 
whether it was so unsafe that the stevedore decision to continue 
using it was "obviously improvident," then the jury could have 
found that the vessel owner should have intervened and stopped 
the loading operation until the winch was repaired.44 
[T]he vessel owes to the stevedore and his longshoremen em-
ployees the duty of exercising due care 'under the circum-
stances.' This duty extends at least to exercising ordinary care 
under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in 
such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will 
be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carryon its cargo 
operations with reasonable safety to persons and property, 
and to warning the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or 
with respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or 
should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care, that 
would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of 
his cargo operations and that are not known to the stevedore 
and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasona-
bly competent in the performance of his work ... The ship-
owner thus has a duty with respect to the condition of the 
ship's gear, equipment, tools, and work space to be used in the 
stevedore operations; and if he fails at least to warn the steve-
dore of hidden danger which would have been known to him 
in the exercise of reasonable care, he has breached his duty 
and is liable if his negligence causes injury to the 
longshoreman. 
451 U.S. at 167. 
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §343, §343(a). 
42. 451 U.S. at 168, n.14. 
43. [d. at 167. 
44. The court articulated the standard for the existence of a dangerous condition 
during stevedoring operations where such condition is known to the stevedore and may 
cause injury to its longshoremen. The court stated that the duty, within the framework 
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell (joined by Justice 
Rehnquist) emphasized the distinction between the Supreme 
Court's approach and the "general reasonableness" standard 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit.4Ii In doing so, Justice Powell high-
lighted that portion of the opinion establishing the vessel's lim-
ited duty with respect to obvious hazards of which it is aware. 
The vessel owner, according to Justice Powell, need only act rea-
sonably in relying on the stevedore to discover and avoid obvi-
ous hazards on the vessel. This standard promotes safety by 
placing responsibility on the party best able to protect the 
longshoremen.48 
Since Scindia, the Ninth Circuit has had occasion to apply 
this case in at least six reported longshore decisions.47 Various 
of the case was: 
[W]hether [the winch] could be safely used or whether it 
posed an unreasonable risk of harm to Santos or other long-
shoremen was a matter of judgment committed to the steve-
dore in the first instance ... Yet it is quite possible, it seems 
to us, that the stevedore's judgment was so obviously improvi-
dent that (the vessel) if it knew of this defect and that (the 
stevedore) was continuing to use it, should have realized the 
winch presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the long-
shoremen, and that in such circumstances it had a duty to in-
tervene and repair the ship's winch. The same would be true if 
the defect existed from the outset and (the vessel) must be 
deemed to have been aware of its condition. 
[d. at 175-76. 
[d. 
45. [d. at 181 (Powell, concurring). 
46. Justice Powell stated: 
The difficulty with a more general reasonableness standard 
like that adopted by the court below is that it fails to deal 
with the problems of allocating responsibility between the ste-
vedore and the shipowner. It may be that it is 'reasonable' for 
a shipowner to rely on the stevedore to discover and avoid 
most obvious hazards. But when, in a suit by a longshoreman, 
a jury is presented with the single question whether it was 
'reasonable' for the shipowner to fail to take action concerning 
a particular obvious hazard, the jury will be quite likely to find 
liability. If such an outcome were to become the norm, negli-
gent stevedores would be receiving windfall recoveries in the 
form of reimbursement for the statutory benefit payments to 
the injured longshoreman. (Footnote omitted.) This would de-
crease significantly the incentives toward safety of the party in 
the best position to prevent injuries, and undercut the pri-
mary responsibility of that party for ensuring safety. 
47. See, for example, Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981), 
Subingsubing v. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd., 682 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1982). These cases, 
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panels of the Ninth Circuit have issued opinions which appear 
divergent with respect to the vessel owner's standard of care in 
longshore claims.'8 Except for the Bandeen case,49 the other five 
reported decisions have tended toward broadening the duty of 
care set out in Scindia."o Not surprisingly, one circuit judge au-
while imposing a duty to warn on the shipowner, would require a warning only in regard 
to hidden (Turner) or non-obvious (Subingsubing) dangers. See also Davis v. 
Partenreederei M.S. NORMANNIA, 657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1981) (longshoreman injured by 
cargo discharged in close proximity to gangway held to have action for negligence based 
on shipowner's concurrent control of the gangway); Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d 318 
(9th Cir. 1982) (shipowner assumed affirmative duty by conducting regular safety inspec-
tions and should have noted and corrected danger created by a third-party sandblaster). 
Hedrick v. Pine Oak Shipping, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983) (defective splice in vang 
pendant caused injury to longshoreman, jury question existed as to whether inspection 
by shipowner would have revealed defect prior to turning vessel over to stevedore); Ban-
deen v. United Carriers, 712 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1983) (vessel owner held not liable where 
longshoreman was injured due to stevedore's failure to provide safety lines). 
48. The panels of each post-Scindia decision are as follows: 
Davis v. Partenreederei M.S. NORMANNIA, 657 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1981) (per 
Grant, R.A., sitting by designation; the other panel members were Fletcher, B.B., and 
Ferguson, W.); 
Turner v. Japan Lines, 651 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Fletcher, B.B.; the other 
panel members were Ferguson, W., and Grant, R.A., sitting by designation); 
Hedrick v. Pine Oaks Shipping, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, A.T.; 
the other panel members were Pregerson, H., and Canby, W.); 
Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Fletcher, B.B.; the other 
panel members were Pregerson, H., and Reinhardt, S.); 
Subingsubing v. Reardon Smith Line, Ltd., 682 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1982) (per 
Fletcher, B.B.; the other panel members were Pregerson, H., and Reinhardt, S.); 
Bandeen v. United Carriers, 712 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, A.T.; the 
other panel members were Canby, W., and Pregerson, H., dissenting); 
Ollestad v. Greenville Steamship Corp, 738 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Fletcher, 
B.B.; the other panel members were Wright, E., and Anderson, J.); 
Taylor v. Moram Agencies, 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Anderson, J.B.; the 
other panel members were Skopil, 0., and Ferguson, W., dissenting); 
49. Bandeen v. United Carriers, 712 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, A.T.; 
the other panel members were Canby, W., and Pregerson, H., dissenting). In Bandeen, a 
longshoreman was injured when he fell from a vessel while loading logs on deck. He 
alleged that defendants were negligent in not providing safety wires between stanchions. 
The district court granted defendant's motion for directed verdict on the ground that the 
stevedore is solely responsible for the longshoreman's safety. [d. at 1338-39. The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, holding that the vessel owner had neither the duty to string safety lines 
nor the duty to intervene when the stevedore failed to do so. [d. at 1340. The dissent 
(Pregerson) emphasized that a vessel owner has a duty to intervene when the stevedore's 
conduct is obviously improvident and that a jury could have so found. [d. at 1341. 
50. See, text accompanying notes 6, 7, 8, 14 supra. In Hedrick v. Pine Oaks Ship-
ping, 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Goodwin, A.T.; the other panel members were 
Pregerson, H., and Canby, W.), a longshoreman was injured by a defective splice in a 
vang pendant (part of the ship's equipment). The trial court granted judgment N.O.V. to 
defendant shipowner, based on the lack of evidence showing knowledge of the defect by 
shipowner. [d. at 1356. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a shipowner has a 
12
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thored the majority opinion in three of those five cases, and she 
sat on the panel of one other:H Two other judges, alone or in 
tandem, were on the panels of all five and one submitted a dis-
senting opinion in Bandeen.1I2 
It is within this framework that the Taylor and Ollestad 
cases came to the fore. Analysis of both decisions is Hlustrative 
of the divergent views in this Circuit regarding the vessel 
owner's standard of care. 
III. THE TAYLOR AND OLLESTAD DECISIONS 
A. Taylor v. Moram Agencies 
In Taylor v. Moram Agencies,1I3 a longshoreman, was in-
jured on board the MN NIKOLAY KARAMZIN owned by Far East-
ern Steamship Company (FESCO) while that vessel was dis-
charging cargo. Plaintiff alleged that he slipped on beans which 
had spilled on deck during the unloading process and sustained 
personal injuries.1I4 This action was subsequently brought 
against the vessel owner FESCO and its agent under §905(b) of 
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, as 
amended in 1972.1111 
Plaintiff contended that FESCO breached its duty to pro-
vide a vessel and equipment in reasonably safe condition, given 
the presence of the torn sacks of mung beans, before cargo oper-
duty to inspect its equipment before turning it over to the stevedore and a jury question 
existed whether a reasonable inspection would have revealed the defective splice. [d. at 
1357. 
51. Circuit Judge Betty Fletcher authored Turner, Subingsubing, and Bueno, and 
she sat on the panel in Davis. 
52. Circuit Judge J: Pregerson sat on the panel in Hedrick, Bueno, Subingsubing, 
and Bandeen (dissenting); Circuit Judge w. J. Ferguson sat on the panel in Davis and 
Turner. It should be noted also, that Circuit Judge S. Reinhardt participated on the 
panels of Bueno and Subingsubing. 
53. 739 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Anderson, J.B.; the other panel members were 
Skopil, 0., and Ferguson, W., dissenting). 
54. A portion of the cargo consisted of sacks of mung beans from Bangkok, which 
are hard, round, green beans the size of BB's. Some of the sacks were torn and leaking 
beans before the unloading operation began. As these sacks were hoisted out of the hold, 
beans spilled onto the main deck and were tracked around the vessel. Apparently, some 
of the beans were blown up onto the steel deck of the winch platform. On the morning of 
the second day of cargo unloading by the stevedore, Crescent Wharf and Warehouse, 
plaintiff lost his footing on the winch platform while taking the slack out of the midship 
guy wire, slipped on the beans and fell on his back and head. [d. at 1387. 
55. See text accompanying note 23, supra. 
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ations began. Further, plaintiff alleged that FESCO assumed ex-
clusive or concurrent control of the winch platform where the 
accident occurred by performing maintenance on the winch and 
by sweeping the deck during the cargo operation. By exercising 
such control, it was asserted that FESCO assumed additional 
duties with respect to these areas. Lastly, plaintiff contended 
that FESCO had knowledge of the presence of the dangerous 
condition on the winch platform, and had an obligation to inter-
vene in the cargo operation to correct it. 
In a bench trial, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California (William W. Schwarzer presid-
ing) entered judgment in favor of defendant FESCO, concluding 
that the vessel owner complied with its responsibility to provide 
a vessel and equipment in reasonably safe condition and that 
there was no hidden danger of which the shipowner had a duty 
to warn the stevedore of. The trial court further held that the 
shipowner had not assumed exclusive or concurrent control of 
the platform where the accident occurred and had no duty to 
intervene in the cargo discharge operation. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court judgment, hold-
ing that the findings of fact rendered by the trial court were not 
"clearly erroneous" and that the lower court applied the proper 
standard of care applicable in its judgment for the shipowner. 
The court held that the torn sacks of beans lying in the hold 
posed no threat to the longshoremen and that it was not the 
torn sacks, but the stevedore's failure to take appropriate pre-
cautions, that created the danger. liS Distinguishing the Turner 
and Subingsubing decisions, the court emphasized the obvi-
ousness of the damaged sacks of beans and the fact, well known 
56. The court stated: 
The torn sacks of beans lying in the hold posed no threat; it 
was only when the cargo discharge began and the wind blew 
the leaking beans onto the deck and winch platform that a 
hazardous condition developed. Thus, it was not the torn 
sacks but the stevedore's subsequent failure to take appropri-
ate precautions in the course of the operation that created the 
danger. Under the provisions of Scindia, a shipowner who has 
turned over a safe vessel and equipment has the right to rely 
on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoreman to 
hazards which develop within the confines of the cargo 
operation. 
739 F.2d at 1386. 
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to the stevedore, that loose beans cause longshoremen to fall. 67 
Having turned over a safe vessel and equipment, FESCO had 
the right to rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing longshore-
men to the hazards of spilled beans.68 
Recognizing that a vessel's active involvement in the cargo 
operation could expose the vessel owner to increased liability,69 
the court held that the winch maintenance and sweeping of 
mung beans performed by the vessel's crew during cargo dis-
charge were insufficient to create the type of involvement or con-
trol necessary to burden the owner with additional responsibili-
ties toward the longshoremen. so The court further acknowledged 
that while primary responsibility for maintaining safe conditions 
during cargo operations rested with the stevedore, a limited ex-
ception exists which might require a vessel owner to intervene to 
correct a dangerous condition.s1 Here, however, the court held 
that even assuming FESCO's knowledge of the loose beans on 
the winch platform, there was no duty to intervene and sweep 
up the beans, since FESCO could reasonably expect the steve-
dore to do what was necessary to protect the longshoremen.82 
Neither the stevedore's contract nor the Chief Mate's agreement 
57. The court stated: 
Here, the damaged condition of the sacks was obvious to the 
stevedore when the hatch was opened. The difficulty with this 
type of cargo was well known to the experienced stevedore 
personnel . . . It was not clearly erroneous for the trial court 
to have found no hidden danger of which the shipowner had a 
duty to warn in the face of the evidence demonstrating that 
the stevedores were well aware of this particular problem and 
of the difficulties which were expected in cargo operations of 
this type. 
739 F.2d at 1387. 
58. Id. at 1386. 
59. Id. at 1387. 
60. The court stated: "The active control over the area or equipment utilized in the 
cargo operation is distinct from the casual use of the deck by the ship's crew for passage 
or activities undertaken by the crew at the specific request of stevedore personnel." Id. 
61. The exception was specified in Scindia and the court stated it as follows: 
An exception to this rule is recognized where a shipowner (1) 
has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition, 
(2) knows that the longshoremen are continuing to work de-
spite the existence of an unreasonable risk of harm to them, 
and (3) could not reasonably expect that the stevedore would 
remedy the situation. (Citations omitted) 
Id. at 1387-88. 
62. Testimony revealed that bean spillage during this type of operation was normal. 
Id. at 1388. 
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to take care of the problem was sufficient basis for the court to 
find shipowner liability.6s 
Circuit Judge Ferguson filed a dissenting OpInIOn, which 
criticized the lower court for applying an incorrect legal stan-
dard in analyzing the facts.6. The dissent viewed the facts as 
compelling a conclusion that FESCO had expressly assumed the 
duty of eliminating the hazard created by the loose beans and 
that the stevedore fulfilled its duty to maintain a safe environ-
ment when it reported the condition to the ship's mate.611 Judge 
Ferguson concluded that finding FESCO not negligent was 
clearly erroneous.66 
B. Ollestad v. Greenville Steamship Corp. 
In Ollestad v. Greenville Steamship Corp.,67 plaintiff in-
jured his leg while working as a longshoreman on board defen-
dant's vessel, the GREENFIELD. The longshoremen were engaged 
to load lumber on the vessel. Before the longshoremen came on 
board, however, the ship's crew removed the hatch covers and 
stacked them on the weather deck. They also left a boom rest68 
lying on the deck. The placement of the hatch covers and boom 
rest made it necessary for workers crossing the weather deck to 
either climb over the hatch covers or boom rest, or slide under 
the boom rest in order to get by.69 Ollestad stepped on the boom 
[d. 
63. With respect to the mate's promise to clean up the beans, the court stated: 
We find that by sweeping the deck, without it being made 
clear that he was also asked to clean the winch platform, the 
mate fulfilled any responsibility the vessel assumed by reason 
of the promise ... By assuming the responsibility for cleaning 
up the original spillage on the deck, the vessel will not be obli-
gated to a continuous duty to clean up additional spillage re-
sulting from the stevedore's failure to properly discharge the 
cargo. 
64. [d. at 1389. 
65. [d. at 1391. 
66. [d. at 1393. 
67. Ollestad v. Greenville Steamship Corp., 738 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1984) (per 
Fletcher, B.B.; the other panel members were Wright, E., and Anderson, J.). 
68. A boom rest is used to support the boom of the vessel when not in use. [d. at 
1050. 
69. During the first day of loading, snow and ice built up on the deck creating a 
slippery condition. The plaintiff had crossed the weather deck several times during the 
morning, passing over the objects obstructing the passageway; however, after lunch, 
plaintiff stepped on the boom rest, slipped and fell, causing his leg injury. [d. 
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rest, slipped and fell, causing his leg injury. 
Ollestad filed an action in the United States District Court 
for the District of Alaska against the vessel owners, alleging neg-
ligence pursuant to §905(b) of the Longshoremen and Harbor 
Worker's Compensation Act, as amended in 1972.70 Plaintiff al-
leged that the shipowners were negligent both in positioning the 
hatch covers in a manner that left an inadequate passageway 
and in allowing the boom rest to obstruct that passageway. 
The jury found negligence on the part of the shipowner in 
creating the conditions on the weather deck, and the trial court 
entered judgment accordingly. Defendants appealed the judg-
ment, contending that the instructions given to the jury were 
erroneous in that they misstated the conditions under which an 
owner may be liable and that an owner has no duty to comply 
with Occupational Safety and Health Administration Longshor-
ing Regulations.71 
70. See note 23 and accompanying text, supra. 
71. The trial court, over defendant's objection, gave the jury the following 
instructions: 
A shipowner has no duty to inspect or to supervise cargo load-
ing or unloading operations under the direction of a stevedore 
company, since it is by law the responsibility of the stevedore 
to provide longshoremen with a reasonably safe place to work, 
reasonably safe equipment and safe working conditions. 
A shipowner is liable to longshoremen for injuries caused by 
an unreasonable risk created by him or known by him or 
which should have been known by him which existed at the 
time the vessel was turned over to the stevedore for cargo op-
erations. A shipowner is also liable to the longshoremen for 
injuries caused by an unreasonable risk of harm existing 
within work areas remaining under the direct control of the 
shipowner or by reason of a danger creating an unreasonable 
risk of harm which is known to the shipowner which the ship-
owner could not reasonably assume would be remedied by the 
stevedore but was within the power and control of the ship-
owner to remedy. 
In your consideration of whether a danger creating an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to longshoremen existed at the time the 
shipowner turned over the vessel GREENFIELD to the stevedore 
for cargo loading or unloading operations, you may consider 
the following regulation as evidence along with all the other 
evidence on plaintiff's claims of negligence. 'Dunnage, hatch 
beams, tarplins, or gear not in use shall be stowed no closer 
than 3 feet to the port and starboard sides of the weather deck 
hatch coaming, except that a reasonable tolerance shall be 
permited where strict adherence is rendered impracticable due 
17
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the instruc-
tions given by the district court were proper, in light of the un-
contested facts of the case.72 While skirting the issue concerning 
the obviousness of the danger,73 the court relied upon the fact 
that the ship's crew created the obstruction or the "risk" and 
that because placement of the hatch covers is work normally 
done by longshoremen, the ship's crew assumed the duty to ex-
ercise the same standard of care required of a stevedore.74 In 
upholding the OSHA jury instruction, the court further held 
that these safety standards, normally applicable to the steve-
dore, imposed additional duties upon a vessel which undertakes 
work normally performed by longshoremen and are relevant in 
determining whether the shipowner exercised reasonable care.7CI 
to the circumstances.' 
738 F.2d at 1050-52 
The trial court rejected defendant's proposed instruction which read in part: 
[d. at 1051. 
If you find that the hazardous condition was open and obvi-
ous, and that it existed before control of the ship was handed 
over to the stevedore, the defendants had a duty to remedy 
the condition only if they had a reasonable belief that the ste-
vedore would not remedy the hazard and that the condition 
presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff. 
72. [d. at 1052. 
73. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit has not decided whether the shipowner's 
knowledge or creation of an obvious dangerous condition that exists at the time the ship 
is turned over to longshoremen is, without more, sufficient to establish liability. See, 
Turner, 651 F.2d at 1304-05, (evidence sufficient to establish shipowner's liability to the 
longshoremen unloading cargo where crew should have known of dangerous, non-obvious 
condition created by foreign stevedore during loading). Davis, 657 F.2d at 1052-53, (evi-
dence sufficient to establish shipowner's liability where ship's crew had placed gangway 
in dangerous position, had a continuing responsibility to correct its position, and was 
aware of the danger); Subingsubing, 682 F.2d at 782, (shipowner had duty of reasonable 
care to remove non-obvious tripping hazard before longshoremen come on board). 
74. The court stated: 
The "risk" referred to in the challenged instruction was the 
obstruction of the weather deck caused by the position of the 
hatch covers and boom rest. This risk was undisputedly cre-
ated by the ship in the course of doing work normally done by 
longshoremen. In doing such work, the ship's crew had the 
duty to exercise the same reasonable care required of a steve-
dore to protect workers who would be continuing longshore 
operations on board. (Citing Bueno v. United States, 687 F.2d 
at 320) 
738 F.2d at 1052. 
75. [d. at 1053. 
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IV. CRITIQUE 
In Scindia, the Supreme Court of the United States clearly 
established the duty that a vessel owner owes to longshoremen 
with respect to open and obvious dangers existing prior to the 
commencement of cargo operations. The court adopted the stan-
dard of care approved in Marine Terminals v. Burnside,?6 which 
essentially is the implied contractual duty owed by a vessel 
owner to the stevedore. Ironically, the duty adopted by the Su-
preme Court was enunciated by the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California in Hugev v. Dampskisaktiesel-
skabet International.?? 
The district court in that case established that the ship-
owner owed a stevedore the following duty: 
(1) To exercise ordinary care under the circum-
stances to place the ship on which the stevedore 
work is to be done, and the equipment and appli-
ances aboard ship, in such condition that an ex-
pert and experienced stevedore contractor, mind-
ful of the dangers he should reasonably expect to 
encounter, arising from the hazards of the ship's 
service or otherwise, will be able, by the exercise 
of ordinary care under the circumstances, to load 
or discharge the cargo, as the case may be, in a 
workmanlike manner and with reasonable safety 
to persons and property; and (2) To give the 
stevedoring contractor reasonable warning of the 
existence of any latent or hidden danger which 
has not been remedied and is not usually encoun-
tered or reasonably to be expected by an expert 
and experienced stevedoring company in the per-
formance of the stevedoring work aboard the ship, 
if the shipowner actually knows or, in the exercise 
of ordinary care under the circumstances, should 
know of the existence of such danger, and the 
danger is one which the shipowner should reason-
ably expect a stevedoring contractor to encounter 
in the performance of the stevedoring contract.'s 
76. 394 U.S. 404 (1969). In Marine Terminals, the Supreme Court analyzed the 
duty owed to a stevedore by a vessel owner. 
77. 170 F.Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959). 
78. Id. at 610-11. That court indicated that these obligations also constituted the 
"duty of ordinary care imposed by law toward persons rightfully transacting business on 
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In adopting this standard, the Supreme Court has estab-
lished that the contractual obligations set forth in Hugev consti-
tute the duty of ordinary care owed by the shipowner to the ste-
vedore and longshoreman with respect to dangers existing when 
the vessel is turned over to the stevedore.79 In so doing, the Su-
preme Court has limited the longshoreman's recovery against a 
vessel owner for injuries resulting from hazards which are obvi-
ous to the stevedore or which the stevedore should reasonably 
expect to encounter only to those situations where the stevedore 
is acting in an "obviously improvident" manner with respect to 
those hazards.80 
As described by Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in 
Scindia,81 there is a good reason why this standard, on its face, 
is seemingly easy on shipowners and unjust to the longshore-
man. He states: 
Under 33 U.S.C. §905(b), the shipowner is liable 
ships." Id. at 610. 
79. The Supreme Court, in Scindia, further stated: 
Furthermore . . . the stevedore normally warrants to dis-
charge his duties in a workmanlike manner; and although the 
1972 Amendments relieved the stevedore of his duty to indem-
nify the shipowner for damages paid to the longshoreman for 
injuries caused by the stevedore's breach of warranty, they did 
not otherwise disturb the contractual undertaking of the ste-
vedore nor the rightful expectation of the vessel that the ste-
vedore would perform his task properly without supervision 
by the ship. (emphasis added) 
451 U.S. 170. 
SO. In Scindia, the court stated: 
Id. at 176. 
The malfunctioning being obvious and Seattle having contin-
ued to use it, Scindia submits that if it was aware of the condi-
tion or was charged with the knowledge of it, it was neverthe-
less entitled to assume that Seattle, the specialist in loading 
and unloading, considered the equipment reasonably safe and 
was entitled to rely upon that judgment. 
Yet, it is quite possible ... that Seattle's judgment in this 
respect was so obviously improvident that Scindia, if it knew 
of the defect and that Seattle was continuing to use it, should 
have realized the winch presented an unreasonable risk of 
harm to the longshoremen and that in such circumstance it 
had a duty to intervene and repair the ship's winch. The same 
would be true if the defect existed from the outset and 
Scindia must be deemed to have been aware of its condition. 
(emphasis added) 
81. ld. at 180 (Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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in damages to the longshoreman if it was negli-
gent, and it may not seek to recover any part of 
this liability from the stevedore. The longshore-
man's recovery is not reduced to reflect the negli-
gence of the stevedore. (Citations omitted) The 
stevedore-even if concurrently negli-
gent-receives reimbursement for its statutory 
benefit payments to the longshoreman, up to the 
full amount of those payments. (Citations omit-
ted) As a result of this automatic reimbursement, 
there is a danger that 'concurrently negligent 
stevedores will be insulated from the obligation to 
pay statutory workman's compensation benefits, 
and thus will have inadequate incentives to pro-
vide a safe working environment for their employ-
ees.' (Citations omitted) In cases involving obvi-
ous and avoidable hazards, this danger will be 
realized unless the shipowner's liability is limited 
to the unusual case in which it should be antici-
pated that the stevedore will fail to act reasona-
bly. Any more stringent, or less defined, rule of 
shipowner liability will skew the statutory scheme 
in a way Congress could not have intended. (Cita-
tions omitted)82 
21 
In practice, the stevedore's compensation insurance carrier 
notices a lien in any action brought by a longshoreman against a 
vessel for injuries. The lien is usually in an amount equal to the 
total amount of compensation and medical payments made. If 
the longshoreman prevails, the award is reduced by the costs 
and attorney's fees incurred in bringing the action.8s The com-
pensation carrier extracts its entire lien amount from the award 
(regardless of any amount of stevedore negligence) and the long-
shoreman receives whatever is left. It is obvious that the com-
pensation carriers are the entities who benefit most from a lib-
eral interpretation of the vessel owners' standard of care. They 
receive insurance premiums from the stevedore, as well as prob-
82. Jd. at 183, n. 2. 
83. An attempt by a longshoreman to compel participation by the stevedore in his 
litigation expenses failed in Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 445 U.S. 74 
(1980). The court held that the LHWCA and its legislative history did not provide for 
the reduction of the stevedore's lien by a percentage of the litigation expenses. To do so 
would be to impose a type of liability on the stevedore barred by the exclusive remedy 
provisions of that Act. Jd. at 85. 
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able total recoupment of benefits, without having to incur attor-
ney's fees. 
The responsibility for providing a safe work place is and al-
ways has been with the stevedore.8• As Justice Powell states in 
his concurring opinion, the vessel owner should only be liable in 
those unusual cases where it should be anticipated that the ste-
vedore will fail to act reasonably. The focus in any analysis 
should be upon whether the shipowner could reasonably expect 
that an expert and experienced stevedore would not or could not 
provide a safe work environment for the longshoremen despite 
the alleged danger. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) regulations pertaining to the longshoring industry,85 
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, established the steve-
dore's duties with respect to the safety of longshoremen.88 These 
safety regulations impress upon the stevedore a statutory stan-
dard of care upon which the vessel owner can reasonably rely.87 
Compliance is mandatory.88 
A review of the Ninth Circuit cases dealing with the ship-
owner's duty of care to longshoremen indicates that certain 
panels of this circuit have failed to fully comprehend the practi-
cal realities described by Justice Powell in his concurring opin-
ion in Scindia.89 Ollestad is the most recent example of the 
84. 33 U.S.C. §941(a) states in relevant part: 
Every employer shall furnish and maintain employment and 
places of employment which shall be reasonably safe for his 
employees in all employments covered by this chapter and 
shall install, furnish, maintain, and use such devices and safe-
guards with particular reference used by and working condi-
tions established by such employers as the Secretary may de-
termine by regulation or order to be reasonably necessary to 
protect the life, health and safety of such employees, and to 
render safe such employment and places of employment, and 
to prevent injury to his employees. 
85. Safety And Health Regulations For Longshoring. 29 C.F.R. §1918 (1984). 
86. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 176. 
87. ld. at 170. 
88. 29 C.F.R. §191O.16, states in relevant part: Each employer shall protect the em-
ployment and places of employment of his employees engaged in a longshoring operation 
... by complying with the appropriate standards prescribed in this paragraph. (empha-
sis added) 
89. See cases cited in note 47, supra. 
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Ninth Circuit's disregard of the principles established in Scindia 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Judge Fletcher, as she has previ-
ously done in the Subingsubing90 and Bueno91 decisions, 
stretches the Scindia holding to new limits in order to find 
against the vessel owner.92 
In Ollestad, Justice Powell's worst fears come true. By rede-
fining the "risk"98 and finding yet another affirmative duty to 
place upon the shipowner,94 Judge Fletcher ignores the real 
question of the vessel owner's right to rely upon the stevedore to 
avoid obvious hazards and approves the use of a jury instruction 
which essentially compels vessel liability whenever the ship-
owner knew or should have known of an "unreasonable risk" 
onboard the vessel where that "risk" causes injury to a long-
shoreman.96 The defendant's proposed instruction which more 
properly states the rule enunciated in Scindia was rejected by 
the court.98 
Ironically, Taylor was decided just two months prior to Ol-
lestad.97 The court in that instance relied heavily upon the ship-
owners right to rely upon the stevedore to protect the longshore-
men from hazards.98 While the Taylor case dealt with cargo and 
not equipment of the vessel,99 the logic remains the same: the 
90. 682 F.2d 779. 
91. 687 F.2d 318. 
92. See notes 46, 82 and accompanying text, supra. 
93. See note 74, supra. 
94. [d. 
95. See note 71, supra. 
96. [d. 
97. Interestingly, Judge J. Blaine Anderson authored Taylor and sat on the panel in 
Ollestad. 
98. See notes 56 and 57, supra. 
99. The Taylor court stated: "The scope of the shipowner's duty as set forth in 
Scindia focuses on the character of the ship and its equipment-not the nature of the 
cargo." 739 F.2d at 1386. 
The court later states, however: 
[d. at 1388. 
Even if the shipowner had knowledge of the beans' invasion of 
the winch platform (a part of the vessel) it would not necessa-
rily follow . . . that the beans created a sufficiently high risk 
of harm to require intervention in the cargo operation by the 
shipowner. . .. In light of custom, regulation, and case law 
. . . it was reasonable for the shipowner to expect the steve-
dore to do what was necessary to maintain a safe place for the 
longshoremen to work. 
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condition (be it a misplaced boom rest or torn sacks of beans) 
does not become an unreasonable risk and create a danger to 
longshoremen until the stevedore fails to take appropriate pre-
cautions in the course of the operation. It is only when the steve-
dore's actions or inaction become known to the vessel owner and 
are said to be "obviously improvident" is a duty to remedy the 
hazard placed upon the shipowner. loo 
In Ollestad, the "risk" was said to be the crews placement 
of the boom rest and hatch cover. The stevedore, however, obvi-
ously did not feel that the condition was an unreasonably dan-
gerous one.101 The longshore crew had used the weather deck the 
morning of the injury to get to and from their work areas and 
plaintiff himself had climbed over the boomrest several times 
prior to the accident. The accumulation of snow and ice on the 
deck during the loading operation contributed to the creation of 
an apparently hazardous condition. Nonetheless, unless the ste-
vedore acted improvidently in proceeding with his work despite 
the existence of this hazard, and the vessel owner had knowledge 
that the stevedore would not or could not avoid the hazard, the 
vessel owner had no obligation to intervene and remedy the 
situation. 
Judge Fletcher in Ollestad relies upon her Bueno decision 
to support the conclusion that the ships placement of the boom 
rest and hatch cover, prior to turning the vessel over, subjected 
them to the same duties and responsibilities owed by a stevedore 
to its longshore employees. l02 Under this rationale, the ship-
owner would be required, contrary to Scindia, to continually in-
spect and supervise the cargo operations and otherwise comply 
with OSHA Regulations. los Even in the Bueno decision, which 
also misapplies Scindia, the affirmative duty allegedly assumed 
by defendants included inspections during the sandblasting op-
100. This test is essentially the same test set out in Scindia for hazards arising dur-
ing the cargo operation, except that where the condition exists from the commencement 
of the operation, knowledge of the condition is presumed. See note 80, supra. 
101. In Taylor, by comparison, the testimony revealed that the stevedore superin-
tendent had walked through the loose beans and did not consider them to be hazardous. 
739 F.2d at 1388. 
102. 738 F.2d at 1052. 
103. In Ollestad, the court stated: "Where the ship undertakes work normally per-
formed by a longshoreman, OSHA standards regulating such work are relevant to the 
jury's consideration of whether the ship exercised reasonable care." Id. at 1053. 
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eration in which the plaintiff was taking part. In Ollestad the 
condition existed at the time the vessel was turned over to the 
stevedore. It was an open and obvious condition which the ship-
owner could reasonably anticipate would be avoided by the ex-
perienced stevedore. Indeed, since it was thought to be a normal 
stevedore function to move the hatch cover and boom rest, it 
was within the stevedore's capability to relocate them if the 
safety of longshoremen required their relocation. l04 
It is well established that if a vessel owner exercises "active 
control" over the areas involved in the cargo operation or be-
comes "actively involved" in a loading or unloading process, the 
vessel may be subject to liability for its negligence. 1011 Unless it 
can be maintained that there is some active involvement or con-
trol during the cargo operations, it would seem logical that the 
vessel owner cannot be saddled with additional affirmative du-
ties. l06 The Taylor panel recognized this axiom and rejected its 
application when it held that the sweeping of the deck by the 
ship's crew did not rise to the type of "active control" required 
by Scindia. 107 It is hard to imagine how an activity performed by 
the vessel's crew before the vessel was turned over to the steve-
dore could create such active involvement, unless custom or con-
tract so provide. l08 
Judge Fletcher distinguishes Scindia as being a case where 
the negligence arose after the cargo operations began.loe This is 
simply not the case, for the triable issue of fact in Scindia was 
whether the shipowner had actual knowledge of the defect in the 
winch or was chargeable with knowledge because the winch was 
104. The court noted in Ollestad that: "Before the longshoremen came on board, 
the ship's crew uncovered the hatches and stacked the hatch covers on the weather deck, 
a job normally performed by longshoremen." Id. at lO50. 
105. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167. 
106. For example, in Taylor, the court stated: "By assuming the responsibility for 
cleaning up the original spillage on the deck, the vessel will not be obligated to a contin-
uous duty to clean up additional spillage resulting from the stevedore's failure to prop-
erly discharge the cargo." 739 F.2d at 1388. 
107. In Taylor, the court held: "The active control over the area or equipment uti-
lized in the cargo operation is distinct from the casual use of the deck by the ship's crew 
for passage or activities undertaken by the crew at the specific request of stevedore per-
sonnel." Id. at 1387. 
108. The Supreme Court in Scindia indicated that contract, positive law, or custom 
could modify the vessel's duty. 451 U.S. at 172. 
lO9. Ollestad, 738 F.2d at lO52. 
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defective from the outset. 110 The defendant in Ollestad was enti-
tled to have its proposed jury instruction read to the jury. The 
legal duties placed on the stevedore and the vessel's justifiable 
expectations that these duties be performed are necessary con-
siderations in determining if a shipowner has breached its duty 
to the longshoremen.111 
The Ollestad decision not only ignores the vessel owner's 
right to rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshore-
men to obvious hazards but goes further to impress upon the 
shipowner the legal duties required of the stevedore by the Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Act. The stevedore is put in the 
envious position of being able to rely upon the shipowner to 
provide for the longshoremen's safety. This result thwarts the 
intent of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA which were in-
tended to encourage the safety of longshoremen.1l2 Under any 
stretch of the law, the stevedore is primarily responsible for en-
suring the safety of its employees since it is in the best position 
to remedy hazards. lls 
Courts in other circuits have taken more realistic ap-
proaches to preexisting obvious conditions on vessels which are 
more in line with the principles established in Scindia. For ex-
ample, the Fourth Circuit in Bonds v. Mortensen and Lange,1l4 
1l0. 451 U.S. 178. 
1l1. The court in Scindia stated: 
As we have indicated, the legal duties placed on the stevedore 
and the vessel's justifiable expectations that those duties will 
be performed are relevant in determining whether the ship-
owner has breached its duty. The trial court and, where ap-
propriate, the jury, should thus be made aware of the scope of 
the stevedore's duty under the positive law. 
451 U.S. at 176. 
1l2. See Scindia, [d. at 163, n. 13. 
1l3. [d. at 181 (Powell concurring). 
114. 717 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1983) (per Field; other members of the panel were Rus-
sell and Ervin). In Bonds, a longshoreman was fatally injured when crushed by a moving 
gantry crane on board defendant's vessel. The warning bell on the gantry crane was ei-
ther not working or was inaudible at the time of the accident, and the crane was so 
designed that the operator could not see anything in the vicinity of the crane legs. In a 
bench trial, the district court found both the longshoreman and the stevedore to be with-
out fault, and adjudged the shipowner to be liable based on a conclusion that the mal-
functioning bell and the ship's design, taken in tandem, constituted the proximate cause 
of the accident. The court of appeals reversed, holding that since the malfunctioning bell 
and ship's design were open and obvious, the shipowner was entitled to rely upon the 
stevedore's judgment that the cargo operations could safely be undertaken. The steve-
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held that a malfunctioning gantry crane bell coupled with an al-
leged defect in ship's design, being open and obvious to all, enti-
tled the vessel owner to rely upon the stevedore's judgment as to 
whether discharge operations could safely be undertaken.n~ 
That court concluded that it was only where the conduct of the 
stevedore or longshoremen, known to the shipowner, was obvi-
ously improvident that the vessel owner had a duty to intervene 
to protect the longshoremen. H6 While the lower court specifi-
cally found the stevedore and longshoremen acted reasonably in 
proceeding with cargo operations in light of the alleged hazard, 
the court stated that even if they found the longshoremen failed 
to act reasonably, the result would be the same since it was not a 
case where the shipowner should have anticipated that the ste-
vedore could not avoid the dangerous condition.l17 
A recent district court decision in the Fifth Circuit inter-
prets Scindia in a similar fashion. H8 In Harrington v. U.S. 
Lines, H9 the court held that the vessel owner may have a duty to 
dore's judgment in proceeding under the circumstances was not "obviously improvi-
dent," since the district court found it to be without fault. Therefore, the shipowner had 
no duty to intervene and stop the cargo operations. 717 F.2d at 128. 
115. [d. at 127-28. 
116. [d. at 128. 
117. The court stated: 
Even assuming, contrary to the District Court's finding of fact, 
that Bonds and other longshoremen failed to exercise reasona-
ble care by standing near the gantry crane legs during dis-
charge operations, this is not a case in which the shipowner 
should have anticipated that the stevedore could not avoid the 
dangerous condition. (Citations omitted) This is not a situa-
tion, then, in which the longshoremen were precluded from 
performing their tasks except by a means that was inherently 
dangerous. (Citations omitted) 
[d. at 128 n.5. 
118. Harrington v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 587 F.Supp. 239 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (Black, S., 
District Judge). 
119. In Harrington, the longshoreman was injured when he fell while descending 
into a hatch on defendant's vessel while attempting to close the doors on a cargo 
container. The open doors had prevented the stevedore from removing the container 
from the hatch. The district court, finding that the condition was one which arose prior 
to the vessel being turned over to the stevedore, held that the unsecured container door 
was not a defect subjecting the defendant to liability. Unsecured container doors are 
commonly encountered in cargo operations and are to be anticipated by the stevedore. 
The court further held that even if the unsecured doors were a defect, there would be no 
duty to warn the stevedore of this condition, since it was obvious or to be anticipated by 
him. Since the vessel owner is in the least effective position to intervene and correct the 
defect, it is entitled to rely upon the stevedore to do so. [d. at 241. 
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correct a defect or condition he knows 'exists at the commence-
ment of the cargo operation when the defect creates an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to the longshoremen and he knows that he 
cannot rely on the stevedore to protect the longshoremen from 
that risk. 120 The existence of an unsecured container door in 
that case did not constitute a "risk" or "hazard" to the long-
shoremen beyond that normally encountered in the unloading of 
a vessel. 121 Even if they did constitute a defect, the court stated 
that the shipowner would not be responsible for warning the ste-
vedore and longshoremen since unsecured container doors are a 
common occurrence and were to be anticipated by the steve-
dore. 122 Further, the condition did not create an "unreasonable 
risk of harm" requiring shipowner intervention because of the 
stevedore and longshoremen's awareness of these conditions.u3 
Certainly, the fact that a condition is "open and obvious" 
does not in and of itself relieve the vessel owner from liability.124 
It does, however, serve to establish that the stevedore is aware 
or should be aware of the condition. As such, it goes to establish 
the reasonableness of the shipowners reliance on the stevedore 
to protect the longshoremen against the danger and eliminate 
any need for the shipowner to warn the longshoremen of the 
danger. There will be situations where the danger will be such 
that the shipowner could not reasonably expect the stevedore to 
correct or avoid the danger to the longshoremen or where the 
stevedores decision to proceed in light of the condition known to 
the shipowner is so unreasonable as to require intervention. In 
those circumstances the vessel owner has a duty to remedy the 
condition. 
The theory of limited vessel owner liability enunciated in 
Scindia, recognizes the justifiable expectations of the vessel that 
the stevedore will perform with reasonable competence and see 
to the safety of the cargo operations. Merely finding both the 
vessel and the stevedore concurrently negligent in various per-
120. Id. at 242. 
121. Id. at 245. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. A shipowner cannot defend on the grounds that the longshoreman should have 
refused to work in the face of an obviously dangerous condition. See Scindia. 451 U.S. at 
176. n. 22. 
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centages is of no practical effect,12II and negates the vessel's right 
to rely upon the stevedore. It cannot be argued that this stan-
dard of care incorporates concepts of assumption of the risk or 
contributory negligence on the part of the longshoremen which 
was the dispute with the Restatement §343 standard.126 While it 
does necessarily impute concepts of contributory negligence on 
the part of the stevedore,127 the focus is not upon the longshore-
man's negligence. In fact, the focus is not even upon the steve-
dore's negligence (although negligence would probably be pre-
sent if the longshoreman was injured because of the stevedores 
failure to avoid the hazard) but rather upon the vessel's reason-
ableness in relying upon an expert stevedore. To that extent, the 
issue can probably be decided through expert witnesses and the 
use of OSHA regulations. In most cases, bifurcation might be 
appropriate,128 where questions of fact preclude summary 
judgment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Judge Fletcher's decision in Ollestad reflects the continuing 
desire of various panels of the Ninth Circuit to subject the ship-
owner to liability for the stevedore's negligence. In enacting the 
1972 amendments to the LHWCA, Congress clearly intended to 
terminate the vessel's automatic, faultless responsibility for con-
ditions caused by the negligence or other defaults of the steve-
dore. u9 Vessel liability is said to be the exception and not the 
rule. ISO The longshoremen have legislatively lost the benefit of 
liberal judgments against vessel owners in return for the higher 
compensation benefits incorporated into the 1972 amendments. 
125. See text accompanying note 82, supra. 
126. See, for example, Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., AlS, 435 F.Supp. 484, 493-
95 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
127. Applying the concept of "superceding causation" to the stevedore's negligence 
is attractive in this instance. See Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 C.2d 688 (1936). This 
theory, however, would not apply when the stevedore's negligence reaches the point 
where it becomes obviously improvident, and a vessel owner with knowledge has a duty 
to intervene. 
128. Bifurcation under FRCP 42(b) would seem appropriate in this instance, since 
this single issue could be dispositive of the vessel's liability and would undoubtedly avoid 
prejudice to a "deep pocket" shipowner. 
129. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 165, n. 12. 
130. In Bandeen v. United Carriers, the court stated: "It is the exceptional case 
under Scindia that the shipowner remains liable as a "deep pocket" defendant, when it 
turns the vessel over to the stevedore." 712 F.2d at 1341. 
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The Ninth Circuit in Ollestad, however, persists in ex-
panding vessel liability contrary to the intent of the 1972 
amendments and the guidelines set down in Scindia. Certain 
panels in this Circuit have refused to recognize that the Su-
preme Court, while affirming the reversal of summary judgment 
in Scindia by the Ninth Circuit, disapproved of its "general rea-
sonableness" standard. l3l The court in Taylor, however, appears 
to reestablish the significance of the shipowners right to rely 
upon the stevedore and the limited scope of the shipowners duty 
to longshoremen for obvious hazards on board the vessel. 
Taylor represents only the second reported decision of the 
Ninth Circuit which in any way limits the vessel owners duty to 
longshoremen, subsequent to the Scindia decision. 132 It is the 
only reported decision since Scindia in this Circuit which em-
phasizes the shipowner's right to rely upon the stevedore with 
respect to open and obvious hazards. It is hoped that Taylor is 
indicative of a shift away from the direction previously taken by 
the Ninth Circuit. The change in course is welcomed and hope-
fully will result in a more consistent and uniform application of 
the principles established in Scindia. 
131. In Dugas v. C. Brower, 85 D.A.R. 828 (March 5, 1985), a California appellate 
court's holding exemplifies the confusion engendered by the Ninth Circuit's conflicting 
opinions. Relying on Subingsubing, the court erroneously observed that a negligent ship-
owners liability may be reduced but not eliminated by the negligence of the stevedore or 
longshoreman. 
132. See also Bandeen, 712 F.2d 1336. 
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CHEVRON U.S.A. v. HAMMOND: 
STATE CONTROL OF 
OIL TANKER DEBALLASTING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Hammond,! the Ninth Circuit 
held that Alaska's deballasting statute2 was not preempted by 
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act3 nor by the Coast Guard 
1. 726 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were 
Alarcon, J. and Nelson, J.). 
2. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(a) Except as provided in (b) of this section, a person may 
not cause or permit the discharge of ballast water from a cargo 
tank of a tank vessel into the waters of the state. A tank vessel 
may not take on petroleum or a petroleum product or by-
product as cargo unless it arrives in ports in the state without 
having discharged ballast from cargo tanks into the waters of 
the state and the master of the vessel certifies that fact on 
forms provided by the department. 
(b) The master of a tank vessel may discharge ballast 
water from a cargo tank of his tank vessel if it is necessary for 
the safety of the tank vessel and no alternative action is feasi-
ble to assure the safety of the tank vessel. 
ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.750(e) (1976), amended by ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.750(a}-(b) (1980), 
hereinafter cited as Alaska Statute. 
3. Title II of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, as amended by the Ports 
and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 (PWSA/PTSA), in pertinent part, is as follows: 
(a) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for design, 
construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, 
equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of vessels to 
which this chapter applies, that may be necessary for in-
creased protection against hazards to life and property, for 
navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced protection of 
the marine environment. . .Regulations prescribed under this 
subsection shall include requirements about-
(7) the reduction or elimination of discharges during 
ballasting, deballasting, tank cleaning, cargo handling, 
or other such activity. 
46 U.S.C. § 3703 (1983). (Formerly 46 U.S.C. § 391a(6)(A)). 
(b)(1) An existing crude oil tanker of at least 40,000 dead-
weight tons shall be equipped with-
(A) segregated ballast tanks; or 
(B) a crude oil washing system. 
46 U.S.C. § 3705 (1983). (Formerly 46 U.S.C. § 391a(7)(0)). 
31 
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regulations4 authorized by the Act.1i 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., brought suit in U.S. district courtS 
challenging the constitutionality of the Alaska Tanker Act.7 The 
The court interpreted the pre-1983 codification of the PWSA!PTSA § 391a. In Au-
gust of 1983 Congress revised portions of Title 46, including § 391a, which was repealed 
and superseded by Revised Title 46 (Supp. 1984). See Title 46 Shipping Laws Partial 
Revision Pamphlet (1983). The new sections have retained most of the same wording 
found in the old sections. 
The purpose of the partial revision of Title 46 was to make the law easier to admin-
ister, less cumbersome to use, and more understandable for everyone. H.R. REP. No. 98-
338, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD NEWS 924, 925. 
4. The PWSA!PTSA gives the Coast Guard, through the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, the authority to regulate deballasting. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a)(7)(1983). The Coast 
Guard has exercised this authority by promulgating regulations; see 33 C.F.R. §§ 
157.03(e), 157.09, 157.10, 157.1l(a)-(c), 157.25 - 157.49. 
(a)Not later than June I, 1981, except as allowed in para-
graph (b) [70,000 deadweight tons or more with a certain con-
struction) of this section, existing vessel of 40,000 DWT [dead-
weight tons) or more that carries crude oil and a new vessel of 
40,000 DWT or more but less than 70,000 DWT that carries 
crude oil must have . 
(1) Segregated ballast tanks ... ; or 
(2) A crude oil washing system that meets the design, 
equipment, and installation requirements of Subpart D of this 
part. 
33 C.F.R. § 157.10a (1980). 
(a) Except as required in paragraph (b) of this section, a 
tank vessel may discharge into the sea an oily mixture from a 
cargo tank ... if the vessel 
(1) Is more than 50 nautical miles from nearest land; 
(2) Is proceeding en route; 
(3) Is discharging at an instantaneous rate of oil content 
not exceeding 60 liters per nautical mile; 
(4) Is an existing vessel and the total quantity of oil dis-
charged into the sea does not exceed 1/15,000 of the total 
quantity of the cargo that the discharge formed a part, or is a 
new vessel and the total quantity of oil discharged into the sea 
does not exceed 1/30,000 of the total quantity of the cargo 
that the discharge formed a part . . . . 
33 C.F.R. § 157.37. 
"(a) Clean ballast may be discharged in accordance with § 157.37(a)(6)." 33 C.F.R. § 
157.43 (1976). 
5. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (1983) (Formerly 46 U.S.C. § 391a (6)(A)), supra note 3; 726 
F.2d 483, 501. 
6. The action originated in the District Court for the District of Alaska. In Decem-
ber of 1977, Intercontinental Bulktank, et al., intervened. In December of 1981, Cordova 
Fisheries Union, et al., were joined in the action as defendants - intervenors. 
7. Supra note 2. The Alaska Tanker Laws include the deballasting statute as well as 
other tanker design and operational provisions. Id. During the litigation and after the 
Supreme Court held that the PWSA/PTSA preempted state laws concerning design and 
construction of tankers, Ray V. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), appellants 
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district court held that the statute was invalid because it was 
preempted by Coast Guard regulations promulgated pursuant to 
the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 and its 
amendments.8 
Defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit arguing that the 
state law was not preempted because Congress had no intent to 
occupy the entire field of water pollution caused by oil tanker 
deballasting and the statute was consistent with the federal stat-
utory scheme and related international conventions to which the 
United States was a party.9 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The PWSA/PTSA 
Congress enacted the Ports and Waterways Safety Act 
(PWSA) in 1972 in an effort to control the environmental 
hazards of oil tanker navigation in U.S. waters.lO The Act con-
tains provisions which set minimum standards for tanker design, 
safety, operation, traffic control, and pollution.ll 
The Ports and Tanker Safety Act (PTSA) was enacted in 
1978 to amend the PWSA.12 The amendment was adopted be-
cause there was a need for more stringent design controls and 
operating standards than originally were required by the 
PWSA.18 
stipulated to the invalidity of most of the provisions of the Alaska Tanker Act, and ap-
pealed only the decision concerning ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.750(e) and its amendments. 
(Appellants Brief at 1-4, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hamond, 726 F.2d 483.). 
8. 726 F.2d at 485. 
9. See generally, Appellants Brief, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.Hamond, 726 F.2d 483. 
10. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-340 §§ WI, 102, 86 
Stat. 424-31 (1972) (Prior to 1978 Amendments of the PTSA). 
11. Id. Title I of the Act focuses on traffic control and Title II of the Act focuses on 
vessel safety and protection of the marine environment through vessel design, construc-
tion, and operational requirements. See also Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 
161 (1978). 
12. Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978) (Codified at 46 U.S.C. § § 391a, re-
pealed and superseded by Revised Title 46 (Supp. 1984). See Title 46 Shipping Laws 
Partial Revision Pamphlet (1983». 
13. Pub. L. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471, 1481 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 3270, 3270-71. The PWSA's standards for vessel design and safety needed to 
be more stringent and comprehensive to mitigate the hazards to life, property, and the 
marine environment. Id. 
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The PWSA/PTSA authorized the Coast Guard to regulate 
deballasting. H Under 33 C.F.R. §§ 157.37, et. seq., tankers are 
prohibited from deballasting oil cargo tanks within fifty miles of 
shore. However, under certain circumstances "clean ballast" 
may be discharged. Iii 
The PWSA/PTSA and the accompanying Coast Guard reg-
ulations are based upon the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships of 1973 (MARPOL) and the 
1978 Protocol entitled International Conference on Tanker 
Safety and Pollution Prevention (MARPOL Protocol).16 
The goal of MARPOL was to completely eliminate interna-
tional pollution of the marine environment by oil and to mini-
mize the incidents of accidental oil discharges. I7 Approximately 
2.5 million tons of oil per year pollute the oceans of the world 
because of maritime accidents and vessel operational dis-
charges. Is Deballasting is an operational discharge. After unload-
14. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a), supra note 3. The PWSA/PTS~ authorizes the Secretary to 
issue appropriate regulations to implement the policies of the Act. Pursuant to this au-
thority, Coast Guard regulations were promulgated at 33 C.F.R. §§ 157.03-157.49. 
15. 33 C.F.R. § 157.43(a); supra note 4. Clean ballast is defined as ballast that: 
(e) ... if discharged from a vessel that is stationary into 
clean, calm water on a clear day, would not -
(1) Produce visible traces of oil on the surface of the 
water or on adjoining shorelines; or 
(2) Cause a sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath 
the surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines. 
33 C.F.R. § 157.03 (1980). The "clean ballast" exception is based upon the 1969 Amend-
ments to the 1954 International Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by 
Oil, codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1004 (1976). Though this section was repealed and 
superseded by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911 (1982) (enabling legislation of the MARPOL the 
exception survived and was incorporated into 33 C.F.R. § 157.03(e). 
16. H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 4849, 4850-51. Though the 1973 Convention (MARPOL) was never ratified 
by the United States, the Protocol of 1978 incorporated many provisions of the earlier 
Convention, including the prohibition of discharge of oily mixtures within 50 miles of the 
nearest land. This provision is incorporated in the Coast Guard regulations under the 
PWSA/PTSA; 33 C.F.R. § 157.37(a). The 1973 Convention was based in large part upon 
the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil and 
its amendments. Id. 
17. H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 4849, 4850-51. See also, Mensah, International Environmental Law: Inter-
national Conventions Concerning Oil Pollution at Sea, 8 CASE W. R. J. INT'L L. 110, 117 
(1976) (citing fourth preambular paragraph of MARPOL, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF./ 
WP. 35 (Nov. 2, 1973), reprinted in, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (1973)). 
18. Kindt, Marine Pollution and Hydrocarbons: The Goal of Minimizing Damage 
to the Marine Environment, 14 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 238, 246 (1984). Approximately 50% 
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ing, tankers must take on ballast to guarantee the vessel's stabil-
ity in navigation. In the case of oil tankers, the ballast is stored 
in the vessel's oil compartments. As a result, the ballast mixes 
with the oil residue and upon deballasting, the oily mixture is 
discharged into the sea. 19 The 1973 Convention, MARPOL, ad-
dressed this problem by requiring certain sizes of new tankers to 
be equipped with segregated ballast tanks20 and by requiring the 
increased use of on-shore reception facilities for ballast dis-
charges. 21 MARPOL incorporated many provisions of the Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Oil of 1954 and its amendments, such as the prohibition of 
oily mixture discharges within 50 miles of shore and the "clean 
ballast" exception now found in the Coast Guard regulations of 
the PWSA/PTSA.22 
After a series of tanker accidents in or near the waters of 
the United States during 1976-77,23 the 1978 Protocol, modifying 
MARPOL safety and pollution standards for oil tankers, was 
adopted by Congress.24 The Protocol recognized the need for 
of all oil consumed in the world is transported by sea. One·tenth of one percent of this 
oil enters the ocean each year. In 1970, five million tons of oil entered the ocean. In 1975, 
that number increased to six million tons. Out of approximately 2.5 million tons of oil 
per year entering the ocean, vessel operational discharges or deballasting make up 85% 
of this figure. See, H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4849, 4851. 
19. H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD NEWS 4849, 4851. Ballast is seawater used to fill the empty cargo tanks of a vessel 
for stabilization purposes. "Ballasting" is the term generally used to describe the process 
by which a vessel takes on this seawater. 
20. 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 110, 118, (1976). New tankers of between 40,000 -
70,000 deadweight tons (DWT) were required to be built with segregated ballast tanks. 
This provision is now incorporated in 33 C.F.R. § 157.lOa(a). See supra note 4. 
21. MARPOL, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONFIWP. 35 (Nov. 2, 1973), reprinted in 12 
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (1973). 
22. See supra note 15; See also, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 110, 118 (1976). The 1954 
Convention and its amendments are codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1006, repealed and 
superseded by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911 (the enabling legislation for the MARPOL Proto-
col of 1978). 
23. Pub. L. 95-474, 92 Stat. 147l (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 3270, 3274-75. As oil importing and tanker movement in U.S. waters increased, 
ship accidents increased. In 1976 there was a rash of tanker accidents. For example, in 
December of 1976, the Sansinena, a Liberian tank vessel, had an explosion and fire while 
taking on ballast and fuel oil at an oil terminal in the Los Angeles Harbor. Eight people 
were killed and fifty others injured. The vessel suffered a total loss and the harbor was 
polluted with fuel oil. [d. 
24. H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 4849, 4850-52; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911 (enabling legislation for the 1978 MARPOL 
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abating or minimizing oil pollution from ships. The federal legis-
lation enacting the Protocol incorporated and superseded the Oil 
Pollution Act Amendments (OPAA) of 1973211 which itself had 
adopted and modified the tanker safety and design standards 
outlined in the 1954 Convention and its amendments. 26 The 
1978 PTSA envisions goals similar to those in the 1978 
Protocol. 27 
B. The CZMA And The FWPCA 
The Coastal Zone Management Act28 (CZMA) enacted in 
1972, deals with marine environmental protection within the 
coastal waters of states.29 The purpose of the Act is to give fed-
eral assistance to states for development programs that preserve 
and restore the resources of the coastal zone.30 Many states have 
utilized federal funds through the CZMA to create such pro-
grams in the areas of wetland and beach preservation and man-
agement of floodplains; the states having complete authority 
over the control of these programs and the use of their territorial 
waters.Sl 
Legislation dealing specifically with water pollution is the 
Federal Water Pollution Control ActS2 (FWPCA). The intent of 
the FWPCA was to protect our nation's waters from pollution.ss 
Protocol). While MARPOL was never ratified, the Protocol was. Id. 
25. Pub. L. NO. 93·119, §§ 2(1)-(7), 87 Stat. 424, 424·26 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1001·1006, repealed and superseded by 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901·1911 (1982) (enabling legisla· 
tion for the MARPOL Protocol». 
26. H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3·4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 4849, 4849·50; See supra note 22. 
27. Compare H.R. REP. No. 1224, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3·4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4849 with the purposes of the PWSA as set out in Pub. L. 92· 
340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972) and the PTSA codified at 46 U.S.C. § 391a, repealed and super· 
seded by Revised Title 46 (Supp. 1984). See supra note 12. 
28. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451·1464 (1982). 
29.Id. 
30. S. REP. No. 753, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess._, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 4776, 4776 "[The] main purpose is the encouragement and assistance of states in 
preparing and implementing management programs to preserve, protect, develop and 
wherever possible restore the resources of the coastal zone of the United States." Id. 
31. [d. The Senate reported: "There is no attempt to diminish state authority 
through federal preemption. The intent of this legislation is to enhance state authority 
by encouraging and assisting the states to assume planning and regulatory powers over 
their coastal zones." Id. See also Owens, Land Acquisition and Coastal Resource Man· 
agement: A Pragmatic Perspective, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 625, 628·29, note 17. 
32. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1241·1376 (1982) (commonly know as the Clean Water Act (CWA». 
33. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess._, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
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The Act was amended in 194834 and again substantially in 1972 
to create more cooperation between the federal government and 
the states in developing a national program for water pollution 
control and abatement. 311 The 1972 amendments to the Act 
called for elimination of the discharge of pollutants into naviga-
ble waters by 1985,36 and more federal-state balance in the per-
mit system.37 The amendments completely restructured the pre-
vious standards set out in earlier amendments38 and place 
primary responsibility on the states for administering the water 
pollution program in compliance with the federal guidelines set 
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).39 
The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA incorporated provi-
sions of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 197040 (WQIA) 
AD. NEWS 3668, 3669. Previously there had been little effort to control water pollution on 
a national level. [d. 
34. [d. 
35. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)(FWPCA). The 1956 amendments to the Act 
called for a federal-state partnership in fighting water pollution and authorized federal 
grants to assist states in their water pollution plans and to build treatment facilities. The 
FWPCA of 1965 required states to develop standards for water pollution control within 
their borders but only pertaining to interstate navigable waters. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd 
Cong., 2d Sess. __ , reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668, 3669. The 
1972 amendments called for the restoration of a federal-state effort in abating or control-
ling water pollution; "It is the Committee's intent to restore the balance of Federal-State 
effort in the program as contemplated by the 1965 and 1966 Acts." [d. at 3675. 
36. S. REP No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. __ , reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 3668, 3674. The Committee believed that a total elimination of water pollution 
was essential to restore the "natural chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters." [d. See also the enabling legislation to the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 
1251(a)(1). "Navigable waters" is defined as, "waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982). 
37. S. REP. No. 414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. __ , reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 3668, 3675. "It is the Committee's intent to restore the balance of Federal-
State effort in the program as . contemplated by the 1965 and 1966 
Acts ... particularly ... in the discharge permit system ... " [d. 
38. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 1 Leg. History 349-50, comments of 
Chairman Blatnik. Compare the 1956 amendments with 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). 
39. [d. at 359, comments of Rep. Jones: "[Tlhis legislation places primary responsi-
bility for administering the water pollution program within the separate states, with the 
firm stipulation that each State must comply with the ... guidelines set by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency." [d. The enabling legislation to the FWPCA also contains 
this reference: "It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the 
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollu-
tion .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). States may set more stringent standards than the federal 
law but not standards below the federal minimum. 33 U.S.C. § 1370. 
40. Pub. L. NO. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 862 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251-1376 (1982). "The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United 
States that there should be no discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the 
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prohibiting the discharge of oil into navigable waters and adjoin-
ing shorelines.41 As the WQIA prescribed, the FWPCA now im-
poses strict liability for clean-up costs after an oil spill when 
there are found to be acts of negligence or willful misconduct.42 
In EPA v. California State Water Resources Control 
Board,43 the Supreme Court held that the EPA has authority 
over states to issue permits under the FWPCA and to approve a 
state's permit program." The court, however, noted that the 
FWPCA allows states to set higher standards for water pollution 
than what may have been set by the EPA pursuant to federal 
law. 4Ci 
In Pacific Legal Foundation u. Costle,46 the Ninth Circuit 
held that while the FWPCA extended permitting authority pri-
marily to the states, only the EPA administrator has authority 
to grant permits for pollutant discharges into the area beyond 
the territorial seas.47 However, the court stated that Congress 
supported a federal-state coordinated effort to effect the goals of 
the FWPCA,4S and that this was a sensible way to deal with the 
jurisdictional problems created by the Act's permitting 
authority.49 
navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon the waters of 
the contiguous zone .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1). 
41. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(1), 1362(7) (1982). 
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1982). See also Guss, Interaction of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act with the Limitation of Liability Act and the General Maritime 
Law, 6 MAR. LAW 199, 201 (1981). 
43. 426 U.S. 200 (1976). 
44. Id. at 214-15. 
45. Id. at 218-20. 
46. 586 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 198 (1980). 
47. Id. at 655. The court supports its holding by referring to the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(b) which says in part, "[T)he Governor of each State desiring to administer its 
own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction may 
submit to the Administrator a full and complete description of the program it proposes 
to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate compact .... " [em-
phasis added). Since the definition of navigable waters excludes the contiguous zone and 
the ocean, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982) (supra note 36) the Administrator under the 
FWPCA must have exclusive permitting authority over areas within U.S. jurisdiction but 
beyond the territorial seas. 
48. 586 F.2d at 657. 
49. Id. The jurisdictional problems created by the FWPCA are stated by the court 
to be the divided jurisdiction of permitting authority. The state has authority to grant 
permits for pollutant discharges within its territorial seas while the Administrator has 
exclusive authority beyond the states' territorial seas. Id. See also supra note 47. 
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C. Preemption Doctirne 
When the state and federal government both regulate a par-
ticular subject matter a question may arise as to whether the 
state law is preempted by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in the 
United States Constitution.1IO 
In Hines v. Davidowitz,r>l the Supreme Court held that the 
Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act of 1939 was void because it 
conflicted with the less stringent rules of the Federal Alien Re-
gistration Act of 1940.r>2 In concluding that the federal law con-
flicted with the Pennsylvania Act,r>3 the Court stated that an ex-
clusive federal scheme of regulation existed with which states 
could not interfere. M The Court's test for determining interfer-
ence was whether or not a state law could be viewed as an "ob-
stacle" to the full accomplishment of congressional objectives.r>r> 
The Court upheld the Hines analysis in Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp.,r>6 when provisions of the Illinois Public Utilities 
Act were found to be preempted by the United States Ware-
house Act. r>7 The Court noted that Congress expressly intended 
50. The Constitution states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, clause 2. 
51. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). The Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act required aliens who 
did not intend to become citizens of the U.S. to register with the state. The law was 
enacted to obtain information about aliens within the state territory. Id. 
52. Id. at 74. The Pennsylvania Act made the failure to register as an alien a crimi-
nal offense while the Federal Act only imposed a criminal penalty upon aliens who will-
fully failed to register. Id. at 60-61. 
53. Id. at 74. 
54. Id. at 66-67. The Court found that Congress' Federal Alien Registration Act was 
enacted pursuant to its constitutional duty "[t)o establish an Uniform Rule of Naturali-
zation." Id. at 66. The Act, being comprehensive in nature, was superior to state laws 
which regulated the area. 
55. Id. at 67. 
56. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Rice brought an action against Santa Fe Elevator Cor-
poration alleging violations of the Illinois Public Utilities Act of 1945. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corporation defended on the ground that the United States Warehouse Act, under which 
the Corporation's activities were lawful, superseded the state regulation. Id. 
57. Id. at 236. The Illinois Public Utilities Act of 1945 related to warehouse licens-
ing. The U.S. Warehouse Act as amended in 1931 preempted the Illinois Act. For an 
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that the federal law would apply exclusively to the area of ware-
house licensing. ~8 
However, in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
Paul,~9 the Court applied a harsher preemption test by requiring 
a finding either of an unmistakable congressional intent to pre-
empt or, that the compliance with both laws would be a "physi-
cal impossibility. "60 
This test was further modified in New York Department of 
Social Services v. Dublino.61 The Court refused to find preemp-
tion absent a clear and manifest congressional intent.62 The 
Court reasoned that the comprehensive nature of the federal law 
in issue is not conclusive evidence of congressional intent63 and 
that preemption should not readily be found where federal-state 
cooperation would help to effect the congressional purpose of 
the law.6 • 
In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield CO.,6~ and Silkwood v. Kerr-
interpretation of Rice and related decisions, from the perspective of how the Supreme 
Court determines congressional intent and whether a field is "occupied" by federal legis-
lation, see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and 
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 625 (1975). 
58. Rice, 331 U.S. at 224, 235-36. 
59. 373 U.S. 132 (1963). Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. was involved in in-
terstate commerce and sought to enjoin California from enforcing a state statute which 
regulated the transportation and sale of avocados in California because the Federal Agri-
cultural Marketing Agreement of 1937 preempted the more stringent state law. 
60. Id. at 142-43. The Court decided that congressional intent to preempt could be 
determined from the nature of the subject matter regulated or an express declaration of 
Congress. Determining congressional design is not required when following both the state 
and federal laws would be a physical impossibility. Id. 
61. 413 U.S. 405 (1973). Dublino challenged provisions of the New York Social Wel-
fare Law which required individuals to accept employment before the state would allow 
applicants to receive federally funded aid to families with dependant children. The Fed-
eral Work Incentive Program (WIN) allocates federal funds for state programs which 
provide aid to families with dependent children. Id. 
62. Id. at 413, 417. 
63. Id. at 415. The federal law in issue was the Federal Work Incentive Program 
(WIN) adopted in the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act. States were required 
to incorporate WIN into their Aid to Families With Dependent Children Programs 
(AFDC - Programs). The state laws sought to be preempted were the 1971 provisions of 
the N.Y. Social Welfare Law or New York Work Rules. 
64. Id. at 418-20. The Court found that WIN was not a complete and comprehensive 
program but really envisioned the states providing supplementary rules to effect the 
goals of the federal program. 
65. 435 U.S. 151 (1978). Ray is the only case to date decided by the Supreme Court 
which interprets the PWSA/PTSA. The case was brought when Atlantic Hichfield Co. 
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McGee Corp.,66 the Supreme Court applied a two-part test to 
determine whether federal regulations preempted state law: (1) 
whether Congress "occupied" a field of law to the extent that 
state law preemption was warranted and, if not, (2) whether the 
state law was invalid because it "conflicted" with the federal 
law.67 
In Ray, the Court held that provisions of the Washington 
State Tanker Law were preempted by the PWSA/PTSA because 
Congress intended the federal law to completely "occupy" the 
field of tanker design and construction due to the need for uni-
form national standards.66 However, the provisions of the Wash-
ington Law concerning tug escorts69 were not "design specifica-
tions" requiring uniform national standards and therefore not 
preempted by the PWSA/PTSA.70 
In Silkwood, the Court held that the state's remedy for tor-
tious conduct in the area of nuclear safety was not preempted by 
the Atomic Energy Act because there was no evidence that Con-
gress intended to "occupy" the field or to bar states from estab-
lishing remedies for injuries suffered from exposure to hazardous 
substances.71 In both cases where the particular area of state law 
passed the "occupied" test, the Court found no existing 
"conflict. "72 
challenged the Washington Tanker Laws which regulated tanker design and construction 
for tankers entering Puget Sound. WASH. REV. CODE § 88.16.170-88.16.190 (1974). 
66. _U.S._, 104 S.Ct. 615 (1984). Silkwood's estate brought an action against 
the Kerr-McGee Corporation on behalf of the deceased Karen Silkwood, to recover per-
sonal injury damages for radiation exposure to Ms. Silkwood when she worked in the 
Corporation's plant in Oklahoma. Id. 
67. Id. at 621; Ray, 435 U.S. at 157-58. 
68. 435 U.S. at 158-63. 1975, Wash. Laws, 1st Extr. Sess., WASH. REV. CODE § 
88.16.170 et seq. (1974)(Tanker Law). The Court distinguished Huron Portland Cement 
Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) which held that a municipal law regulating air pollu-
tion from ships entering its ports was not preempted by federal vessel licensing laws 
even though complying with the Detroit ordinance would require ships to be equipped 
with smoke abatement devices not otherwise mandated by federal law. The Ray Court 
held that the Huron decision was based on the finding that the federal and municipru 
laws did not "overlap" in purpose or scope whereas here, the Washington laws were en-
acted with the same purposes in mind and regulated the same areas as the PWSA/ 
PTSA. See 435 U.S. at 165. 
69. Wash. Rev. Code § 88.16.190 (1974). 
70. Ray, 435 U.S. at 179-80. 
71. _U.S._, 104 S.Ct. at 622-24. 
72. Id. at 626; Ray, 435 U.S. at 173. 
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The Supreme Court, as well as the Ninth Circuit, has been 
reluctant to apply the preemption doctrine when the possibility 
of conflict between the state and federal laws is only specula-
tive.73 For example, in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland," 
it was argued that a Maryland statute prohibiting oil producers 
and refiners from operating retail service stations and regulating 
temporary price reductions was invalid because it "conflicted" 
with the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman 
Act.711 The Court denied the existence of any conflict between 
the statutes and noted that the potential for conflict was too 
speculative to warrant a finding of preemption.76 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed the pre-
emption doctrine in Morseburg v. Balyon,77 when it held that 
the California Resale Royalties Act was not preempted by the 
1909 Copyright Act.78 The court reasoned that "occupation" and 
"conflict" are more easily found "when the emphasis is to pro-
tect and strengthen national power."79 The court found the cru-
73. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 130·31 (1978) (A Maryland 
statute prohibiting oil producers and refiners from entering the retail gas sales market 
was not in conflict with the Robinson-Patman Act and the potential for conflict in differ-
ent situations was too speculative to find preemption; Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
416 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1974) (Ohio's trade secret laws were not preempted by federal 
patent laws since there was no great possibility that the state law would conflict with 
federal policy in the patent law area; William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. I.T.T. Conti-
nental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1049 (9th Cir. 1981) (The possibility that the Califor-
nia Unfair Practices Act may proscribe conduct that federal antitrust laws permit was 
not sufficient to apply preemption). 
74. 435 U.S. 117 (1978). 
75. Id. at 122, note 5, 129. Exxon argued that the Maryland statute conflicted with § 
2(b) of the Clayton act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982), as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 
which is a goodfaith defense to voluntary allowance of price reductions. However, the 
Court held that the § 2(b) defense was not applicable to a situation where the oil com-
pany gives its own retailer a reduced price to help the retailer lower prices to meet the 
competition. Id. at 129-30. Exxon also argued that state law should be held invalid be-
cause it was a violation of the Due Process clause and created an undue burden on inter-
state commerce. These claims were rejected by the Court. [d. at 131. 
76. [d. at 131. 
77. 621 F.2d 972, 976-78 (9th Cir. 1980). Morseburg, an art dealer, was required to 
pay royalties on paintings he sold pursuant to the California Resale Royalties Act. CAL. 
~v. CODE § 986 (Deering's Supp. 1984). Morseburg argued that the California Act was 
preempted by the 1909 Copyright Act because the California Act impaired his ability to 
sell his "work of fine art" within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act. Morseburg, 621 
F.2d at 975. 
78. Id. at 978. The 1909 Act does not provide for a resale royalty. The court also 
found that a requirement to pay such a royalty does not "impermissibly restrict" the 
owner's ability to resell his/her art. Id. 
79. Id. at 976. See also Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on 
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cial inquiry to be whether the two laws function "harmoniously 
rather than discordantly."8o 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit applied the two-part Silkwood test81 in 
determining that Alaska's deballasting statute was not pre-
empted by the PWSA/PTSA.82 Considering the first part of the 
test, whether Congress intended to "occupy" the field of debal-
lasting, the court found no express congressional intent to do so 
within the federal legislation,83 and proceeded to determine 
whether such a legislative intent could be implied. 
The court first distinguished Ray8" by finding that there 
were significant differences between the subject matter regulated 
in Ray and that regulated by the Alaska Tanker Act. The Wash-
ington Law regulated tanker design characteristics, while the 
Alaska Law challenged on appeal regulated ocean pollutant dis-
charges.8C1 The court stated that the Ray holding should be lim-
ited to preemption of state laws regulating tanker design and 
construction.86 
Applying the Rice87 decision, the court analyzed the legisla-
tive intent of the PWSA/PTSA's pollution control provisions 
and noted that a state's police powers should not be superseded 
by federal legislation unless there is clear congressional intent to 
do SO.88 Since the legislative record of the PWSA/PTSA was 
void of any congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pol-
lutant discharges,89 the court compared it to other federal 
marine environmental protection statutes90 to determine 
Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM L. REV. 623 (1975). 
80. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978. 
81. _U.S._, 104 S.Ct. 615. 
82. 726 F.2d at 501. 
83. Id. at 486. 
84. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). 
85. Id. at 487-88. 
86.Id. 
87. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
88. 726 F.2d at 488 (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230). 
89. Id. at 489. 
90. The court cites the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) and the Marine Pro-
tection, Research & Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1982)(MPRSA). MPRSA 
regulates pollution dumping beyond the 3 mile territorial seas. The court also cites other 
federal acts, including the Deep Water Port Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1982), giving 
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whether it could find an implied intent. Dl 
The court analyzed the FWPCA and found it to be evidence 
of a congressional policy supporting more stringent state regula-
tion for the protection of the local marine environment. D2 Based 
upon this evidence, the court determined that there was no com-
pelling need for uniform national standards in the area of pollu-
tant discharges,D8 unlike the area of tanker design and construc-
tion where uniformity is necessary to alleviate conflict among 
various ports. D4 
The court buttressed their argument by analogizing the 
PWSA/PTSA with the OPAA.DII The OPAA approved the 1969 
amendments to the 1954 International Convention for Preven-
tion of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,D8 which prohibited certain 
oily mixture discharges within 50 miles of shore.D7 Since the 
OP AA contemplated stricter standards being set by states under 
the FWPCA,D8 the analogy between the PWSA/PTSA and the 
OP AA lead the court to conclude that Congress intended stricter 
state standards for oil pollution be enforced within three miles 
of shore in addition to the Coast Guard regulations issued under 
the PWSA/PTSA.99 
the Coast Guard authority over ports beyond the 3 mile territorial seas, and the Coastal 
Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982), which provides assis-
tance for states' Coastal Zone Management Plans. 726 F.2d at 489. See supra note 30, 31. 
91. 726 F.2d at 489. 
92. Id. at 491. The court found that under the FWPCA states maintain control for 
limiting pollution within their jurisdictions. The court stated: "Thus, in the CW A 
[FWPCA) Congress has clearly expressed its intent to allow the states to take an active 
role in abating water pollution." Id. at 489 (citing Pacific Legal Foundation v. Costle, 586 
F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 445 U.S. 198 (1980). 
93. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 726 F.2d at 491. 
94. Id. at 492. Relying on Dublino, 413 U.S. at 415, the court rejected the argument 
that the comprehensive nature of the PWSA!PTSA evinces federal intent to occupy the 
entire field of water pollution discharges and noted that "the legislative history [of the 
PWSA!PTSA) ... may stand equally for the proposition that the problem of tanker 
caused pollution is complex, must be approached from many angles, and requires a di-
versity of solutions." Id. 
95. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 726 F.2d at 495; Pub. L. 93-119, 87 Stat. 424, codified at 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1006 (1982), repealed and superseded by MARPOL Protocol, supra 
note 29. The PTSA is based upon the Protocol, supra note 17, hence the analogy. 
96. The U.S. ratified the 1954 Convention and implementing legislation was passed 
in 1961. Pub. L. 87-167, 75 Stat. 402 (1961). 
97. Supra note 22. 
98. 726 F.2d at 494-95 (citing 119 Congo Rec. 14,588, 14,590 (1973». 
99. Id. at 495. 
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Under the second part of the Silkwood test, the court con-
sidered whether the Alaska Statute, on its face or in its purpose, 
conflicted with the PWSA/PTSA.loO The court noted that rather 
than conflict, the statutes' objectives are compatible.lol Follow-
ing Exxon,102 the court concluded that where separate legislative 
schemes reflect the same goals, courts should be reluctant to in-
fer preemption. l03 
Finally, the court rejected the argument posited by Chevron 
that following the state law was a ,harsh economic burden not 
contemplated by the Federal Act because Alaska's required use 
of its on-shore reception facilities was imposed in addition to the 
federal requirement that tankers maintain crude oil washing sys-
tems. It found that the crude oil washing system was still neces-
sary in ports that did not have on-shore reception facilities for 
deballasting. lo, The court also held that the economic burden 
did not convert the state requirement into an indirect design 
feature which, following Ray, would require preemption. 1011 
IV. CRITIQUE 
The Ninth Circuit is the first court to consider whether the 
PWSA/PTSA preempts state law in the area of tanker pollutant 
discharges within a state's territorial waters. In holding that the 
Federal Act does not preempt state regulations, the court follows 
a trend not to find preemption absent clear congressional intent, 
and where state and federal laws can function harmoniously. 
The court may also be establishing a new trend not to preempt 
where uniform national standards are not required based upon 
the nature of the activity regulated. 
100, [d. at 495-501. 
101. [d. at 496. 
102. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
103. 726 F.2d at 497 (citing Exxon, 437 U.S. at 132). 
104. 726 F.2d at 499-501. Appellees argued that since the usual practice of tankers is 
to de ballast beyond 50 miles, clean the tanks with the crude oil washing systems on the 
vessel, take on new ballast, and then discharge this "clean ballast" in the port, requiring 
tankers to use a port's reception facilities to deballast would make the crude oil washing 
systems required by the PWSA!PTSA superfluous and would create a harsh economic 
burden. [d. 
105, [d. at 500, The court stated: "While this requirement [use of on-shore reception 
facilities for deballasting) may impose some financial burden on the regulated vessels 
and require their owners to make some economic choices in order to comply, such a 
burden neither converts the discharge prohibition into a design feature nor justifies a 
finding of federal preemption." See also supra note 70. 
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The recent trend to not find preemption where state and 
federal law can function concurrently is evidenced by the Dub-
lino,108 Exxon,107 and Morseburg l08 decisions. In all of these 
cases the courts looked at the objectives and compatibility of the 
state law with the purposes of the federal law!09 The court cor-
rectly utilized these decisions to bolster its argument that pre-
emption should not easily be found where the statutes at issue 
do not actually conflict and where the goals of both laws are the 
same. l1 O 
The Ninth Circuit not only finds the federal and state stat-
utes have similar goals in the area of pollutant discharges, III but, 
by looking into the federal statutory scheme of water pollution 
control, advances the thellry that Congress believed that a fed-
eral-state partnership is the best means for controlling water 
pollution within a state's territorial waters.ll2 
The court properly bases its conclusion of congressional in-
tent upon federal law and international agreements in the area 
of water pollution abatement. For example, the Alaska Statute's 
requirement that oil tankers utilize on-shore reception facilities 
to deballast,113 was the type of requirement contemplated by the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the 
Sea by Oil of 1954,114 and the Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships of 1973, llI! supported by the United 
106. See Dublino, 413 U.S. at 418-20. For an analysis of the trend set by Dublino 
and other cases see Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federal· 
ism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM L. REV. 623, 650-53 (1975). 
107. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 132. 
108. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 977. 
109. See Dublino, 413 U.S. at 418-20, Exxon, 437 U.S. at 132, and Morseburg, 621 
F.2d at 977. 
110. 726 F.2d at 487, 496-98. 
Ill. Id. at 496-97. 
112. Id. at 489-91, 494-95. 
113. See supra note 2. 
114. Opened for signature May 12, 1954 (1961) 1 U.S.T. 2987, T.I.A.S. NO. 4900, 
324 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 18 VIII, reprinted in Mensah, Environmental Law: International 
Conventions Concerning Oil Pollution at Sea, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 110, 114 (1976). 
The Convention provides that, "States parties to it shall ensure the provision in their 
ports of facilities adequate for reception without causing undue delay to ships, of such 
residues from oily ballast and tank washing ... " Id. 
115. Regulation 15, The 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Poilu· 
tion from Ships, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF/WP. 35 (Nov. 2, 1973), reprinted in 12 INT'L 
LEGAL MATERIALS 1319 (1973). 
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States. 1HI Additionally, the FWPCA provisions relating to the 
prohibition of oil discharge into U.S. navigable waters and ad-
joining shorelinesll7 overlap with the goals and policy of the 
PWSA/PTSA.1l8 
Though cited briefly by the court in a footnote, the Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1972119 (CZMA) is persuasive evidence 
supporting the proposition that Congress has deferred control 
and management of the coastal zone to the states. The main 
purpose of the Act is to give assistance to states to develop and 
implement coastal zone management programs.120 The intent of 
Congress was not to preempt, but to support, state regulation of 
the coastal zone.121 
It may be argued that since Congress expressly stated it did 
not intend to preempt state regulation in the CZMA, yet failed 
to express that same intent directly in the language of the 
PWSA/PTSA, Congress must have intended to preempt state 
regulation of oil pollution under the PWSA/PTSA. 
However, when both Acts are properly read together, it is 
clear that what Congress did not express in the PWSA/PTSA is 
expressed by Congress in the CZMA and the FWPCA by the 
authority given to the states over their territorial waters. 
Finally, the court may be establishing a new trend to not 
find preemption where the nature of the activity regulated is 
such that uniform national standards are not required. The Su-
preme Court recently advanced this proposition in Ray when it 
held that Washington's tug escort provisions did not regulate ac-
tivity demanding of national standards, and therefore did not 
warrant preemption.122 
116. Supra notes 108 and 109. 
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(l) (1982). 
118. Compare 46 U.S.C. § 391a, repealed and superceded by Revised Title 46 (Supp. 
1984). See supra note 12) with 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982). 
119. 726 F.2d at 489, note 7. See supra note 86 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451·1464 
(1982». 
120. S. REP. No. 753, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess._, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 4776, 4776. 
121. [d. See also supra note 31. 
122. 435 U.S. at 179 (citing Cooley V. Board of Wardens, 12 HOW. 299 (1852». 
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At least within the confines of the PWSA/PTSA, the Ninth 
Circuit correctly expanded this proposition to hold that oil pol-
lutant discharges within state territorial waters is not the kind 
of activity which requires uniform national standards.123 It is not 
a "design characteristic" which the Ray court said requires uni-
form national treatment,l24 but is more akin to a tug escort pro-
vision amenable to state regulation where otherwise not in con-
flict with the Coast Guard regulations. 1211 
V. CONCLUSION 
In order to arrive at its decision, the Ninth Circuit inter-
preted various federal laws and international agreements regard-
ing ocean pollution control that together comprise a federal stat-
utory scheme providing for federal-state coordination in marine 
environmental protection. 
In the future, courts should adhere to the Ninth Circuit's 
opinion and view marine environmental protection as an area in 
need of federal-state partnership. Members of industry, state, 
and federal government should work together in seeking solu-
tions to the problem of oil pollution. 
Michelle T. Leighton* 
123. 726 F.2d at 491. 
124. 435 U.S. at 171. 
125. 435 U.S. at 179-80. "[A) tug escort provision is not a design requirement, such 
as is promulgated under Title II [of the PWSA/PTSA). It is more akin to an operating 
rule arising from the peculiarities of local waters ... c1early within the reach of the Secre-
tary's authority under [Title I) ... [which) merely authorizes and does not require the 
Secretary to issue regulations .... " [d. at 171. The Ray Court found that there was no 
exercise of that authority and therefore held valid the tug escort provisions of the Wash-
ington statute. [d. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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